This AN is for RT1170 to use caam built-in blob encapsulation and decapsulation.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose
Protecting sensitive data on the device is a critical requirement. This goal can be achieved by storing the data in an encrypted form. Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) uses blobs, which are cryptographic data structures, in order to protect data. It provides both confidentiality and integrity protection.

1.2 Audience and scope
This document is for i.MX RT1170 users who want to understand:
- CAAM's built-in blob protocol for protecting user-defined data across system power cycles
- How to encapsulate and decapsulate red or black key blobs in RAM
- How to encapsulate and decapsulate red or black key blobs in secure RAM

The reader must be familiar with the basics of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic algorithm.

1.3 Acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AES-ECB</td>
<td>AES Electronic Codebook Mode</td>
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<tr>
<td>AES-CCM</td>
<td>the Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code Mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKEK</td>
<td>Blob-Key Encryption Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BK</td>
<td>Blob Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blob</td>
<td>Data structure used by CAAM to protect data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAM</td>
<td>Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Message Authentication Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDKEK</td>
<td>Job Descriptor Key Encryption Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDKEK</td>
<td>Trusted Descriptor Key Encryption Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>Random Access Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNG</td>
<td>Random Number Generator</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td>Key-Derivation Function</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEM</td>
<td>Original Equipment Manufacturer - an organization that makes devices from component parts bought from other organizations</td>
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</table>

2 Overview
CAAM can protect data in a cryptographic data structure, which provides both confidentiality and integrity protection. The CAAM's built-in blob protocol provides a method for protecting user-defined data across system power cycles. The data to be protected can be stored in RAM or secure RAM.
protected is encrypted so that it can be safely placed into non-volatile storage before the chip is powered down. Each time that the blob protocol is used to protect data, a different, randomly generated key is used to encrypt the data. This random key is itself encrypted using a Key-Encryption Key (BKEK), and the resulting encrypted key is then stored along with the encrypted data. The BKEK is derived from the chip's master secret key, so the BKEK can be recreated when the chip powers are up again. The combination of an encrypted key and encrypted data is called a blob.

2.1 Blob conformance considerations

In the context of CAAM, a blob is encrypted data that is bound to a specific device by virtue of using a secret non-volatile, device-specific master key. This master key is used only for creating and extracting blob data, and the value of this key itself cannot be extracted from a device. To protect data that requires a high level of security, blob creation is performed in hardware using 256-bit security strength. AES-256 is used as the encryption algorithm and SHA-256 is used for key derivation.

CAAM blobs provide both confidentiality and integrity protection for the encapsulated data. Because a blob protects both confidentiality and integrity, it may be stored in external long-term storage such as flash. Counter with cipher block chaining-message authentication code (AES-CCM) is used as the bulk encryption algorithm.

Note: The MAC associated with a blob provides integrity protection not only for the encrypted data that the blob contains, but also for all intermediate keys used in the creation of a blob.

Many different blobs can exist at the same time, used for different purposes and subject to different security policies. To guarantee that blobs are not inadvertently or intentionally swapped, CAAM encrypts different blobs with different keys. Two mechanisms are used to guarantee that a single key is not used to encrypt unrelated data and to ensure that each key is used to encrypt as little data as possible. One of these mechanisms is random key generation. Each time that a blob is created, CAAM generates a different, random 256-bit key using CAAM's internal hardware Random Number Generator (RNG). This blob key is used to encrypt the blob data using AES-CCM, which provides both confidentiality and integrity protection. The second mechanism is key derivation using a device-unique non-volatile master key as the key-derivation key. The volatile random blob key is encrypted with the non-volatile key derived from the master key and then stored with the blob so that the blob data can be decrypted during subsequent power-on cycles. Different types of blobs are encrypted using different keys derived from the master key. The derived keys are further differentiated by a key modifier supplied by software that can be used to guarantee that one blob cannot be inadvertently or maliciously substituted for another blob. Software can use these key modifiers to differentiate specific data, or to prevent replay attacks (replacing the current blob with an out-of-date version of the blob).

3 Blob types

CAAM supports different types of blobs, and a coded value of the blob type is used as an input to the Key Derivation Function (KDF). It prevents a blob that was exported as one type from being imported as another type as it would decrypt improperly and fail the MAC tag check. The Table 2 below lists the types of blobs that CAAM supports. The type categories are orthogonal, that is, a blob has one type from each type category. For instance, one blob may be a normal format / black key / general memory blob, while another blob may be a test format / general data / Secure Memory blob. In addition, black
key blobs are differentiated by encryption mode and encryption key, so one black key blob may be an AES-ECB / TDKEK type and another black key blob may be an AES-CCM / JDKEK type.

Table 2. Blob types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Category</th>
<th>Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>Formats</td>
<td>Normal format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Test format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Master key verification format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>General data (that is, red blobs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black keys (that is, black blobs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Encryption modes: AES-ECB and AES-CCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Encryption keys: JDKEK and TDKEK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory types</td>
<td>General memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure memory</td>
</tr>
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</table>

3.1 Blob types differentiated by format

CAAM supports three different formats for blobs, usable for all blob content types, all blob memory types, and all blob security state types. The figure below describes the blob formats and how they work.

A normal-format blob consists of the encrypted blob key, the encrypted data, and a message authentication code (MAC) tag, as shown on the left side of the figure. A randomly generated, 256-bit blob key is used to encrypt the data using the AES-CCM cryptographic algorithm. AES-CCM encrypts the data and also yields a MAC tag that is used to protect the data’s integrity. The blob key itself is encrypted in AES-ECB mode using a 256-bit BKEK. Checking the MAC directly authenticates the data encapsulated in the blob. The blob key is indirectly authenticated because substitution or corruption of the encrypted blob key yields an incorrect plaintext blob key. It causes the blob content to be decrypted incorrectly, which is detected by the MAC check. As a normal-format blob is used to protect actual data, BKEK that is used to encrypt the blob key for a normal format blob is secret, having been derived from the secret master key.

As shown in the middle of the figure, a test-format blob consists of a normal-format blob, with the unencrypted BKEK and unencrypted blob key prepended. As the purpose of a test-format blob is to facilitate testing blob encapsulation and decapsulation, BKEK for a
test-format blob is derived from a known test key. CAAM permits test-format blobs to be encapsulated or decapsulated only when CAAM is in non-secure mode.

As shown on the right side of the figure, a master key verification format blob consists of only the unencrypted BKEK. As the purpose of a master key verification format blob is to verify that the master key has been properly programmed, BKEK for a master key verification format blob is derived from the secret master key. To ensure the secrecy of BKEKs used for normal format blobs, the derivation is different from the derivation used for normal format blobs. It ensures that BKEKs used to protect data cannot be exposed by examining the BKEK values in master key verification format blobs.

**Note:** The test format blob and the master key verification format blob are not supported in i.MX RT1170 SDK example, in order to keep OEM's secret data safe.

### 3.2 Blob types differentiated by content

Unencrypted data that should be protected is sometimes referred to as "red data". Thus, the type of blob intended for general data (which is left unencrypted when the blob is decapsulated) is called a red blob. When CAAM is instructed to encapsulate data as a red blob, it assumes that the data to be encapsulated is unencrypted, and proceeds to encrypt the data with the blob key. Likewise, when CAAM is instructed to decapsulate a red blob, it assumes that the data that is decapsulated is to be left in memory unencrypted. Other mechanisms, such as an operating system or hypervisor acting with a memory management unit, may be used to protect the data before it is encapsulated into a blob and after it is decapsulated from a blob. CAAM's secure RAM can also be used to protect unencapsulated data.

CAAM's black blob mechanism is a means for translating between black key encapsulation and blob encapsulation without exposing the key during the translation process. A black blob is simply a blob whose input during blob encapsulation is assumed to be a black key. Its output during blob decapsulation is either a black key that is written into memory or an unencrypted key that is placed directly into a Key Register. CAAM supports the protection of cryptographic session keys by encrypting these keys in a "black key" encapsulation format when storing them in memory via a FIFO STORE command and then decapsulating them "on-the-fly" as they are referenced by a Job Descriptor with a descriptor KEY command. Black key encapsulation or decapsulation is very quick, but black keys are intended only for protection during the current SoC power-on session. Black keys encapsulated during one chip power-on session cannot be decapsulated on subsequent power-on sessions. It happens because the key-encryption key (JDKEK or TDKEK) is erased during power-down and is replaced by a new randomly generated key encryption key at power-up. To protect a key so that it can be recovered on subsequent power cycles, the key must be encapsulated as a blob. A key could be encapsulated as a red blob, but it would require exposing the key in memory in unencrypted form. To avoid exposing keys in unencrypted form, CAAM supports the concept of black blobs. (Data that is not sensitive to disclosure, either because it is inherently non-sensitive or because it always remains encrypted, is sometimes referred to as "black data").

### 3.3 Blob types differentiated by memory

CAAM supports blobs for use with different types of memory:

- General memory blobs contain data that originated from any memory accessible to CAAM.
- Secure memory blobs contain data that originated from CAAM's Secure Memory.
All of the blob-format types and blob-content types are available for use with either general memory blobs or Secure Memory blobs. The input data for Secure Memory blob encapsulation must all come from a single Secure Memory partition, and a Secure Memory blob can be decapsulated only to a single Secure Memory partition. If not, the encapsulation or decapsulation process is terminated with an error indication before reading or writing the second partition. CAAM immediately aborts any attempt to decapsulate a secure memory blob into memory other than CAAM Secure Memory, because it would bypass the access controls implemented by Secure Memory.

Another important way that Secure Memory blobs differ from general memory blobs is in the derivation of the blob-key encryption key (BKEK). The BKEK for general memory blobs is derived from the master key or the test key, in non-secure mode, the 128-bit key modifier value within the blob descriptor, and a blob type identifier that includes a constant specific to general memory blobs. The BKEK for Secure Memory blobs is also derived from the master key or the test key, in non-secure mode, but uses a 64-bit key modifier value within the blob descriptor, and a blob type identifier that includes a constant specific to Secure Memory blobs, and the values in the PSSDID, SMAPJR, and SMAG2/1JR registers of the partition that the blob is being exported from, or imported to. The reason that the PSSDID, SMAPJR, and SMAGR contents are included in the BKEK derivation for Secure Memory blobs is to bind cryptographically the access permissions to the blob. It ensures that a Secure Memory blob can be imported only into a partition with the same access permission settings (and Security Domain ownership) as the partition from which the blob was exported.

Note: For more information about Secure Memory, see i.MX RT1170 SRM, chapter 6.11.8.

4 Blob encapsulation

A data blob is encrypted using a blob key (BK), which is a random number used as an AES-CCM key. The NIST AES-CCM specification states that for any key, all invocations must use distinct nonces and counter blocks. Although CAAM uses the same nonce and initial counter block values for all data blobs, CAAM satisfies the AES-CCM requirement because each encryption operation uses a different key (that is, a random number generated by the RNG). The nonce is given as all zeros, and so the initial block \( B0 = 3B00_0000_0000_0000_0000_0000_0000_0000h \), where \( xxxx \) is the number of bytes of plaintext (maximum length is 65535 bytes), while the initial counter value \( Ctr0=0300_0000_0000_0000_0000_0000_0000_0000h \). These values are automatically generated during the encapsulation operation.

Figure 2 shows the entire blob-encryption operation. \( B0 \) is generated internally and stored in the Class 1 Context DWords 0 and 1, while \( Ctr0 \), also generated internally, is stored in Class 1 Context DWords 2 and 3. The random BK value is stored in the Class 1 Key Register, and the operation mode is set to AES-CCM.

If the plaintext data is in Secure Memory and the data is exported as a Secure Memory blob, then all data must be from the same partition. At the blob pointer, the first 32 bytes contain the key blob, which is the encrypted value of the random blob key. Output ciphertext data (data blob) is stored at the blob pointer + 32. The generated message authentication code (MAC, the signature over the data blob) is stored in the final 16 bytes of the blob.
Blob decapsulation

Before decrypting a data blob, the associated key blob must be decrypted to obtain the blob key. The key blob resides at the blob pointer. AES-ECB mode is used to decrypt the key blob using the BKEK. Generation of the BKEK for general memory blobs and Secure Memory blobs is described below.

Ctr0 and B0 are generated internally, and are stored in the Class 1 Context 1 and Context 2 registers, respectively (see Figure 3). AES-CCM mode is used to decrypt the data blob (starting at the blob pointer + 32), using the decrypted blob key. If the decrypted data is from a Secure Memory blob, then the decrypted data must be written into Secure Memory and all of the data must be written into the same partition. If any of the pages are not within the same partition of Secure Memory, the blob decryption process is terminated with an error, but any data written prior to the error overwrites the previous data within the partition.
6 Using Keyblob function

This section describes how to use the blob encapsulation and decapsulation function in a different mode.

When using the attached CAAM driver example, the default settings of the blob example are to generate a red blob and a black blob in AES-ECB mode that are placed in processor’s RAM. The 256-bit or 128-bit OEM secret key and key modifier needed for master key derivation are generated by RNG. Figure 4 shows the logs of generating a red blob and a black blob in default settings.

OEMs can generate a red blob and a black blob in secure memory by adding the definition of “SECUREMEMORY” in the blob input and output buffer are placed in CAAM secure RAM. For secure memory settings, see i.MX RT1170 SRM, chapter 6.11.8.

The attached example also supports the AES-CCM mode for black blob generation. The major change is the key length of the blob input. Meanwhile, the job descriptor should change to the AES-CCM mode.

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The keyblob encapsulation and decapsulation functionality can be enabled using the attachment that contains fsl_caam.c, fsl_caam.h, and caam.c. For more information, see the latest AN release available on www.nxp.com.

The following documents may offer further reference.

- Demo Application to Generate Red/Black Blobs Using CAAM and Encrypt/Decrypt Data (document AN12554)
- Security Reference Manual for the i.MX RT1170 Processor (document i.MX RT1170 SRM)
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