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i.MX Android Security User's Guide

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User guide

Document information

Information	Content
Keywords	Android, i.MX, android-16.0.0_1.4.0
Abstract	This is a guide of how to do customization work on security features supported by i.MX Android software.



1 Preface

1.1 About This Document

This is a guide of how to do customization work on security features supported by i.MX Android software. It provides an overview of the i.MX Android security features and it focuses on how to configure and use these security features.

The released code can be built into images both with and without Trusty OS integrated while the Trusty OS related contents in this document can only be applied on the images with Trusty OS integrated.

Different SoCs may have different security-related hardware modules. This document has provided detailed information about it. Users of a specific SoC only need to focus on the information about the specific one. If the SoC type is not explicitly specified, refer to the common descriptions for all SoCs.

1.2 NXP security disclaimer

- NXP has documented how to correctly configure the security IPs in the documentation for the i.MX family.
- It is not possible to provide a universal secure configuration for Trusty OS that meets all users' requirements and the security of Trusty OS is enhanced release by release.
- Users should therefore customize the Trusty OS security configuration to lock and secure their end products according to their specific security requirements.
- NXP delivers Trusty OS including its Android space secure modules as an open-source software enablement and not as a secure production ready implementation.
- Using Google AOSP Trusty OS source codes instead of NXP Trusty OS source codes might have an impact on the features supported and security level of i.MX platforms.

1.3 Conventions

The following conventions are used in this document:

- Software code is shown in `Consolas` font.
- `${MY_ANDROID}` is a reference to the i.MX Android source code root directory.
- `${MY_TRUSTY}` is a reference to i.MX Trusty OS source code root directory.

2 Overview of i.MX Android Security Features

2.1 Introduction of security-related hardware modules

Security features are based on security-related codes, which need to do some cryptographic calculations to protect security data. Security requires that only security-related code is allowed to run on certain hardware resources. Therefore, these hardware resources are called security-related hardware modules. There are some security hardware modules on the i.MX platform, which co-work with the Trusty OS to guarantee security:

- CAAM: Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module, is a hardware component of a System on Chip (SoC) that provides security assurance and hardware acceleration of cryptographic algorithms, packet encapsulation and decapsulation, and other cryptographic operations.
- TrustZone: Arm TrustZone creates an isolated secure world, which can be used to provide confidentiality and integrity to the system. It is used to protect high-value code and data for diverse use cases like authentication. It is frequently used to provide a security boundary for the Trusted Execution Environment, like Trusty OS.
- TZASC: TrustZone Address Space Controller, is an Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture (AMBA) compliant SoC peripheral. It is a high-performance, area-optimized address space controller to protect

security-sensitive software and data in a trusted execution environment against potentially compromised software running on the platform.

- CSU: Central Security Unit sets access control policies between the bus masters and bus slaves, enabling the peripherals to be separated into distinct security domains.
- RDC: Resource Domain Controller (RDC) provides support for the isolation of destination memory mapped locations such as peripherals and memory to a single core, a bus master, or set of cores and bus masters.
- xRDC: On i.MX 8QuadMax and i.MX 8QuadXPlus, the eXtended Resource Domain Controller (xRDC) replaces the RDC and TrustZone components (CSU, TZASC, etc.), which can be found in previous i.MX processors.

i.MX 8QuadMax and i.MX 8QuadXPlus SoC contain a mix of Cortex-A and Cortex-M CPUs, which frequently operate in an asymmetric mode with different software environments executing on them. To keep these software environments from unintentionally interfering with each other, the SoC contains xRDC to enforce isolation. The xRDC operates in a manner like Arm's TrustZone. Transactions from masters are annotated with user-side band information to indicate their domain and the access control logic allows/disallows accesses to peripherals/memory based on this information.

- TRDC: The Trusted Resource Domain Controller (TRDC) replaces the RDC and TrustZone components (CSU, TZASC, etc.), which can be found in previous i.MX processors. TRDC has similar features with xRDC. The chip uses a domain based resource control architecture for the memory/peripheral resource sharing and isolation between the Cortex-A platform, Cortex-M cores, and other bus masters. A key feature of this architecture is that it is possible for either Cortex-A platform, the Cortex-M platform, or ELE to program the resource domain control access lists to implement a customer-defined policy. Any peripheral can be assigned to any domain. The TRDC supports multiple regions with flexible access permission control for each memory space.
- System Manager: The System Manager (SM) is a low-level system function which runs on a System Control Processor (SCP) to support isolation and management of power domains, clocks, resets, sensors, pins, etc. It often runs on a Cortex-M processor and provides an abstraction to many of the underlying features of the hardware. The primary purpose of the SM is to allow isolation between software running on different cores in the SoC. It does this by having exclusive access to critical resources such as those controlling power, clocks, reset, PMIC, etc. and then providing an RPC interface to those clients. This allows the SM to provide access control, arbitration, and aggregation policies for those shared critical resources.
- AHAB/HABv4: The Advanced High Assurance Boot (AHAB) and High Assurance Boot (HABv4) support authentication on the images by using cryptography operations to prevent unauthorized software from being executed during the device boot sequence. Details about how to verify images with HAB can be found in Chapter 2.1.
- SCU: The System Controller Unit (SCU) is only for i.MX 8QuadMax and i.MX 8QuadXPlus platforms. It consists of a Cortex-M4 processor and a set of peripherals and interfaces to connect to an external PMIC and to control internal subsystems. The SCU Cortex-M4 is the first processor to boot the chip. The SCU is dedicated to:
 - Boot management
 - Power management
 - External power management by communicating with external PMIC
 - Internal power management of all the subsystems
 - Clock and reset management
 - I/O configuration and muxing
 - Resource partitioning/access control
- SECO: The Security Controller Subsystem (SECO) is only for i.MX 8QuadMax and i.MX 8QuadXPlus platforms. It manages several security hardware modules (CAAM, SNVS, OTP, ADM, etc.) to perform cryptography acceleration and ensure the security of the whole system.
- ELE: The EdgeLock Secure Enclave (ELE) introduces Platform Security services to a SoC, building upon an embedded security enclave. Whereas the passive security element subsystem is essentially securing itself and then performing crypto and key management functions, the ELE adds new trust-based services such

as SoC secure boot, debug domains, distributed subsystem security state management for SoC security IP and low power, advanced root of trust management of fuses and start of life security decisions, support for optimized fast boot (automotive), attestation, tamper detection and response, and other features.

- eMMC RPMB: RPMB is a separate physical partition in the eMMC device designed for secure data storage. Every access to RPMB is authenticated and it allows the host to store data to this area in an authenticated and replay protected manner.

In Trusty OS, the RPMB partition is managed as the secure storage to store all critical data like lock/unlock status, rollback index, etc.

The following table lists the modules on the i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus, i.MX 8M Mini, and i.MX 8M Quad platforms:

Table 1. Modules on the i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus, i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Quad platforms

Modules	i.MX 8QuadMax and 8QuadXPlus	i.MX 8M Quad, 8M Mini, 8M Nano, and 8M Plus	i.MX 8ULP	i.MX 95
CAAM	Y	Y	Y	N
TZASC	N	Y	N	N
CSU	N	Y	N	N
RDC	N	Y	N	N
xRDC	Y	N	Y	N
TRDC	N	N	N	Y
System Manager	N	N	N	Y
AHAB	Y	N	Y	Y
HABv4	N	Y	N	N
SCU	Y	N	N	N
SECO	Y	N	N	N
ELE	N	N	Y	Y
eMMC	Y	Y	Y	Y

2.2 Trusty OS security recommendations for i.MX 8 SoC configuration

2.2.1 Secure CSU configuration

The Central Security Unit (CSU) manages the system security policy for peripheral access on the SoC. The CSU allows trusted code to set individual security access privileges on each of the peripherals, using one of the eight security access privilege levels. The CSU may assign bus master security privileges during bus transactions according to the programmed policy. The CSU has two primary security-related features:

- Peripheral Access Policy: The appropriate bus master privilege and identity are required to access each peripheral.
- Masters Privilege Policy: The CSU overrides the bus master privilege signals (secure/non-secure).

On the i.MX 8M platforms, Trusty OS and other software components such as ATF, SPL, and potentially U-Boot (if run in the secure world) have access to CSU registers and potentially configure or overwrite peripheral access and master privilege policies. The secure code (CSU driver) may have a non-secure CSU configuration by default. The CSU configuration should be modified from the default non-secure configuration based on the security requirements of the final application/end product:

- The CSU_CS_N registers that control the Peripheral access policy and the CSU_SA registers that control the Masters privilege policy should be set appropriately.
- All CSU register configuration should be locked with the appropriate bit fields to prevent any CSU modification at runtime.
- The CSU may need to be re-configured upon power state transitions depending on the i.MX platform and low-power support.

Note:

- Since *imx-android-11.0.0_2.2.0*, the Trusty OS and ATF have made some default CSU configuration for reference.
- For more information, refer to the CSU chapter and Security Integration chapters in the respective SoC i.MX Security Reference Manual.
- An i.MX Security Checklist is available and should be perused to ensure the end product is correctly secured.

2.2.2 Secure TZASC configuration

The TrustZone Address Space Controller (TZASC) protects security-sensitive SW and data in a trusted execution environment against potentially compromised SW running on the platform. The i.MX 8M platforms use the TZC-380 controller.

On the i.MX 8M platforms, Trusty OS and other software components such as ATF, SPL, and potentially U-Boot (if run in the secure world) have access to the TZASC registers and potentially configure or overwrite memory regions. The secure code may have a non-secure TZASC configuration by default. The TZASC configuration should be modified from the default non-secure configuration based on the security requirements of the final application/end product:

- Set the memory regions to meet the security requirement.
- The region 0 should be set to secure to prevent any access to secure memory through aliased memory range.
- Memory region configuration must be locked to prevent runtime modification.
- Depending on the platform, the TZASC may need to be re-configured upon power state transitions.

Note:

- Since *imx-android-11.0.0_1.0.0*, the default ATF has the reference code to configure Trusty OS memory region as TZASC protected.
- For more information, refer to the SoC i.MX Security Reference Manual and the CoreLink TrustZone Address Space Controller TZC-380 Technical Reference Manual.
- An i.MX Security Checklist is available and should be reviewed to ensure the end product is correctly secured.

2.2.3 Secure OCRAM configuration

The OCRAM (On Chip RAM) is a small memory embedded on the SoC. The OCRAM size varies based on the i.MX SoC. Just like the DRAM, the OCRAM memory can be protected by the TrustZone through configuration. The OCRAM supports TrustZone and non-TrustZone accesses and there is an option to configure a TrustZone-only access region. The CSU can be used to set access permissions to the OCRAM memory and in addition has programmable lock bits to prevent runtime modifications.

On the i.MX 8M platforms, Trusty OS and other software components such as ATF, SPL, and potentially U-Boot (if run in the secure world) can potentially configure or overwrite peripheral access and master privilege policies. However, the secure world and the non-secure world have both access to the GPR registers. The OCRAM configuration should be modified from the default non-secure configuration to a secure configuration based on the security requirements of the final application/end product:

- Check the Secure CSU configuration recommendations.
- The CSU must be set to protect the OCRAM.

- The respective GPR registers must be set to enable the protection of the OCRAM by the TrustZone.
- Lock GPR and CSU registers with the respective lock bits to prevent runtime modifications.

Note:

- *i.MX 8M Plus, 8M Quad, and 8M Nano have this configured in ATF.*
- *For more information, refer to the CSU chapter and Security Integration chapters in the respective SoC i.MX Security Reference Manual.*
- *An i.MX Security Checklist is available and should be reviewed to ensure the end product is correctly secured.*

2.2.4 Secure RDC configuration

The Resource Domain Controller (RDC) provides support for the isolation of destination memory mapped locations such as peripherals and memory to a single core, a bus master, or set of cores and bus masters. The RDC provides a mechanism to allow boot time configuration code to establish resource domains by assigning cores, bus masters, peripherals and memory regions to domain identifiers. Once configured, bus transactions are monitored to restrict accesses initiated by cores and bus masters to their respective peripherals and memory.

On the i.MX 8M platforms, the secure world and the non-secure world have both access permissions to the RDC registers. The RDC configuration should be modified from the default non-secure configuration to a secure configuration based on the security requirements of the final application/end product:

- Check the code for default and non-secure RDC configuration.
- Set the RDC configuration for your security requirements.
- Ensure that the settings do not conflict with the CSU and AIPSTZ configurations.
- Lock the RDC settings with the respective lock bits to prevent runtime modifications.

Note:

- *For more information, refer to the RDC chapter and Security Integration chapters in the respective SoC i.MX Security Reference Manual.*
- *An i.MX Security Checklist is available and should be reviewed to ensure the end product is correctly secured.*

2.2.5 Secure AIPSTZ configuration

The AIPSTZ is a peripheral designed as the bridge between AHB bus and peripherals with the lower bandwidth IP Slave (IPS) buses. The AIPSTZ bridge provides programmable access protections for both masters and peripherals. It allows the privilege level of a master to be overridden, forcing it to user mode privilege, and allows masters to be designated as trusted or untrusted.

On the i.MX 8M platforms, the secure world and the non-secure world have both access the AIPSTZ registers. The AIPSTZ configuration should be modified from the default non-secure configuration to a secure configuration based on the security requirements of the final application/end product:

- Check the code for default and non-secure AIPSTZ configuration.
- Set the AIPSTZ configuration for your security requirements.
- Ensure that the settings do not conflict with the CSU and RDC configurations.
- Lock the AIPSTZ settings with lock bits to prevent runtime modifications.

Note:

- *For more information, refer to the AIPSTZ Chapter in the respective SoC i.MX Reference Manual and the SoC i.MX Security Reference Manual.*
- *An i.MX Security Checklist is available and should be reviewed to ensure the end product is correctly secured.*

2.2.6 SCU/SCFW

On the i.MX 8QuadMax and 8QuadXPlus platforms, System Controller Firmware (SCFW) which running on the System Controller Unit (SCU) maintains the power, clock and security components like xRDC and TZASC. Other software components can communicate with SCU by the SCFW APIs.

By default, the Trusty OS is running on the secure partition and this is configured in the ATF. Refer to the SCFW API manual for more information.

2.3 i.MX Android security framework

i.MX Android/Android Automotive security framework includes secure enhanced U-Boot, Android/Android Auto, i.MX Trusty OS, and the related hardware.

Secure enhanced U-Boot provides the Android Verified Boot module, keys provisioning interface, and secure storage proxy.

Android Verified Boot assures the end user of the integrity of the software loaded and started by secure-enhanced U-Boot. This is defined by Google, and more details can be found in <https://source.android.com/security/verifiedboot/avb>.

Key provisioning interface provides the RPMB keys, key attestation, and AVB keys provisioning interface. These interfaces can be used to inject the keys into the device to make it secure.

Secure Storage Proxy is the client of Secure Storage service from Trusty OS. It helps to access the RPMB secure storage device by SoC IPs.

Android/Android Auto platform, based on Google's design, integrates the Keymaster HAL, Gatekeeper HAL, and Secure Storage proxy.

Keymaster HAL uses trusty-backed one and supports Keymaster V2 and Keymaster V3 APIs. For more details about keymaster, see <https://source.android.com/security/keystore>.

Gatekeeper also uses the Trusty-backed gatekeeper HAL. For more details about gatekeeper, see <https://source.android.com/security/authentication/gatekeeper>.

i.MX Trusty OS is based on Trusty OS that is released from Google. Secure TAs and services are integrated in it. Trusty OS is a very important module for the whole security of i.MX Android/Android Auto platform.

Trusty OS provides a trusty-ipc, which is used to realize communication between secure and non-secure world. Trusty OS has the hardware driver for CAAM used for keyblob calculation and security algorithm acceleration.

The following figure shows the logic between these components.




Figure 1. i.MX Android security framework

The following figure shows the i.MX Android/Android Auto security trust chain.




Figure 2. i.MX Android security trust chain

Secure root key is programmed into the One Time Programmable (OTP) eFuse hardware in i.MX chips and work as the root trust of the solution. It is used by CAAM to generate other keys. In the trust chain, the HAB/AHAB, AVB, and DM-Verity are used by a different level to verify the specific images or encrypt user data.

After power-on, the boot process begins, U-Boot and Trusty OS are loaded by ROM code. They are the first to be verified by ROM code with HAB/AHAB. They can only be executed after they pass the verification. U-Boot loads the Linux kernel and uses AVB to verify it before jumping to the Linux kernel. The Linux kernel mounts the Android file system. Data access from Android file system will be verified by DM-Verity to assure integrity. The security chain is formed by these features.

3 Customization work on i.MX Android Security Features

3.1 Verifying images with HAB

The i.MX family of application processors provides the High Assurance Boot (HAB) feature in the on-chip ROM. The ROM is responsible for loading the initial image and verifying the image before the image is executed.

Due to the new architecture, multiple firmware and software images are required to boot i.MX 8/9 family devices. NXP defines "container" to organize images. AHAB for i.MX 8Quad, i.MX 8ULP, and i.MX 95 devices can recognize the format of "container" and verify the images in a container. For i.MX 8M devices, these images are stored in the format of Flattened Image Tree (FIT) with an appropriate Image Vector Table (IVT) set. HABv4

for i.MX 8M devices can recognize this format and verify the images. By default, HAB verification is enabled and i.MX chip is in open stage, so failure of HAB verification does not block the boot process. After closing the chip, only correctly signed images can be executed.

This section covers AHAB used on i.MX 8Quad, i.MX 8ULP, and i.MX 95 family devices and HABv4 used on i.MX 8M family devices.

3.1.1 Secure boot with AHAB

AHAB is closely bound with "container". Detailed information about "container" can be found in the reference manual of specific chips. According to the reference manual, the hash values of multiple firmware and software components are stored in the container header. The container sign process described below embeds an SRK table in the container and signs the container. The contents described in the sign process are used to verify the container during the boot time. Currently, i.MX 8Quad and i.MX 8ULP support "container" version 1, and i.MX 95 supports "container" version 2. The difference results in different configurations when signing the images.

For i.MX 8QuadMax MEK and i.MX 8QuadXPlus MEK, "container" is used to organize the SECO firmware, SCU firmware, MCU software, Arm Trusted Firmware, Trusty OS, and U-Boot. For i.MX 8ULP and i.MX 95, "container" is used to organize the ELE firmware, uPower firmware, MCU software, Arm Trusted Firmware, Trusty OS, and U-Boot.

The SECO firmware on i.MX 8Quad or the ELE firmware on i.MX 8ULP and i.MX 95 are always in the first container. The UUU U-Boot images have three containers included:

- The first container contains the SECO/ELE firmware.
- The second container is constructed in build time and appended to the first container. This container contains SPL.
- The third container is also constructed in build time. It contains the U-Boot proper.

Taking `u-boot-imx8qm-mek-uuu.imx` as an example, its high-level layout structure is shown in the following figure.




Figure 3. Layout structure for u-boot-imx8qm-mek-uuu.imx

For the single-bootloader condition, the normal U-Boot images have no structural differences from UUU U-Boot images, except for the difference in the functional configuration. Taking `u-boot-imx8qm.imx` of standard Android images as an example, the layout structure is shown in the following figure.




Figure 4. Layout structure for u-boot-imx8qm.imx

For dual-bootloader condition, take `spl-imx8qm-trusty-dual.bin` and `bootloader-imx8qm-trusty-dual.img` of Android images as an example. The first container and the second container are combined as one image, and the third container is combined as another image. The following figure shows the layout structure.




Figure 5. Layout structure for spl-imx8qm-trusty-dual.bin and bootloader-imx8qm-trusty-dual.img

Like i.MX 8Quad, the normal U-Boot image on i.MX 8ULP and i.MX 95 also has three containers. The single-bootloader and dual-bootloader conditions have the similar layout.

To sign the containers constructed in the process of building Android images, perform the following steps:

1. Download Code Signing Tool (CST) by searching for "IMX_CST_TOOL_NEW" from [nxp.com](https://www.nxp.com). Decompress the package using the following command:

```
$ tar zxvf IMX_CST_TOOL_NEW.tgz
```

To support the "container" version 2 on i.MX 95, the CST tool version must be 4.0.0 or higher.

2. Generate the AHAB PKI tree. After the tool package is decompressed, enter the directory of `${CST}/keys/`, and execute the following command:

```
$ ../linux64/bin/ahab_pki_tree
```

Then enter the desired parameters based on the output of this script. Besides classic keys, the CST also supports Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and hybrid keys, which are supported on i.MX 95. See the documentation in the CST for more details. This document demonstrates the parameters for both classic keys and hybrid keys.

For classic keys, an example is shown as follows:

```
Do you want to use an existing CA key (y/n)? : n
Select the key type (possible values: rsa, rsa-pss, ecc, dilithium, ml-dsa, hybrid): ecc
Enter length for elliptic curve to be used for PKI tree (Possible values p256, p384, p521): p384
Enter the digest algorithm to use (Possible values: sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512): sha384
```

```
Enter PKI tree duration (years): 10
Do you want the SRK certificates to have the CA flag set? (y/n): n
```

For hybrid keys (used on i.MX 95), an example is shown as follows:

```
Do you want to use an existing CA key (y/n)? : n
Select the key type (possible values: rsa, rsa-pss, ecc, dilithium, ml-dsa,
hybrid): hybrid
Enter classical/pqc algorithm combinations (Possible values p384_dilithium3,
p384_mldsa65, p521_dilithium5, p521_mldsa87): p384_dilithium3
Enter the digest algorithm to use (Possible values: sha256, sha384, sha512,
sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512): sha384
Enter PKI tree duration (years): 10
Do you want the SRK certificates to have the CA flag set? (y/n): y
```

After the preceding command is successfully executed, the private keys are under the `keys/` directory, and the public key certificates are under the `certs/` directory.

3. Generate AHAB SRK tables.

Enter the directory of `${CST}/certs/`. For "container" version 1 and classic key, which are used on i.MX 8ULP and i.MX 8Quad platforms, execute the following command:

```
$ ../linux64/bin/srktool -a -s sha384 -t SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin \
-e SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin -f 1 -c \
SRK1_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr_cert.pem, \
SRK2_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr_cert.pem, \
SRK3_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr_cert.pem, \
SRK4_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr_cert.pem
```

In addition, for i.MX 8ULP, it only has 8 words of SRK fuses. Regenerate `SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin` by SHA256 from `SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin`:

```
$ openssl dgst -binary -sha256 SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin > SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin
```

For "container" version 2 and hybrid keys, which are used on the i.MX 95 platform, execute the following command:

```
& ../linux64/bin/srktool -a 2 -s sha384 -t SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin \
-e SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin -c \
SRK1_sha384_p384_dilithium3_v3_ca_cert.pem, \
SRK2_sha384_p384_dilithium3_v3_ca_cert.pem, \
SRK3_sha384_p384_dilithium3_v3_ca_cert.pem, \
SRK4_sha384_p384_dilithium3_v3_ca_cert.pem
```

After the command is executed successfully, the SRK table and its SHA512 or SHA256 value are generated and saved respectively in two files under `${CST}/certs/`.

The SRK table is embedded in the container in the process of signing that container. Therefore, during the boot time, it can be used to verify the signature. If the signature is authenticated, the hash value of firmware and software images can be trusted to verify the corresponding firmware and software. The SRK table hash value is fused to the OTP eFuse hardware and works as the "secure root key". It is used to verify the SRK table embedded in the container.

Files generated in `${CST}/keys/` and `${CST}/certs/` are important. If the SRK HASH value is fused to the chip and then the chip is changed from open to close state, the board can only boot with images signed with these files.

It is suggested to use a dedicated copy of the CST package for different device families, since this process generates files with the same names in the same directory.

4. Build Android images to construct the containers to be signed.

To use AHAB to verify images in SPL, enable `CONFIG_AHAB_BOOT` configurations in corresponding defconfig files in U-Boot code. they are not enabled by default. Take `imx8qm_mek_android_trusty_dual_defconfig` as an example:

```
diff --git a/configs/imx8qm_mek_android_trusty_dual_defconfig b/configs/
imx8qm_mek_android_trusty_dual_defconfig
index 7a8a7a3c1c5..d441bded80d 100644
--- a/configs/imx8qm_mek_android_trusty_dual_defconfig
+++ b/configs/imx8qm_mek_android_trusty_dual_defconfig
@@ -214,3 +214,4 @@ CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER="nxp"
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL="MEK-MX8Q"
CONFIG_SHA256=y
CONFIG_DUAL_BOOTLOADER=y
+CONFIG_AHAB_BOOT=y
```

`mkimage_imx8` is a tool used to construct containers. It outputs the layout information of a container on the standard output when constructing it. When building the Android images, save the log information of the build system. For example, execute the following command:

```
$ ./imx-make.sh -j12 2>&1 | tee make_android.txt
```

During the build process, the build system output information is saved in `make_android.txt`. The three-example layout mentioned above can be categorized into two when signing the images: the image file directly generated by `mkimage_imx8` and the image file not directly generated by `mkimage_imx8`. As `mkimage_imx8` outputs the container layout information in a file generated by itself, if the image file is directly generated by `mkimage_imx8`, the layout information parameter can be directly used. If the final image is assembled with intermediate files generated by `mkimage_imx8`, the layout information parameters need to be properly processed before being used.

A single-bootloader image, such as `u-boot-imx8qm.imx`, is assembled with two files generated by `mkimage_imx8`. In fact, the dual-bootloader condition keeps these two files separated, while the single-bootloader condition appends one file after another at a 1 kB aligned boundary.

5. Get the layout information of containers in a file.

Layout information is needed when signing the container. To be more specific, it is the offset information of the container and the container signature block in a file. The code signing tool uses these offsets to locate the container in a file. The layout information can be found in `make_android.txt` just generated. With the following principles, the offset of the container to be signed in a file can be easily found.

The generated files with containers to be signed mentioned before are built based on different U-Boot defconfig files. Different U-Boot compilation targets with different U-Boot defconfig files can be found in `${MY_ANDROID}/device/nxp/${PLATFORM}/${BOARD}/BoardConfig.mk`. Taking i.MX 8QuadMax MEK and i.MX 8QuadXPlus MEK as example, the U-Boot configurations are listed below with some annotations.

```
# bootloader-imx8qm.img and spl-imx8qm.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG := imx8qm:imx8qm_mek_androidauto_trusty_defconfig
# bootloader-imx8qm-secure-unlock.img and spl-imx8qm-secure-unlock.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qm-secure-
unlock:imx8qm_mek_androidauto_trusty_secure_unlock_defconfig
# bootloader-imx8qxp.img and spl-imx8qxp.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qxp:imx8qxp_mek_androidauto_trusty_defconfig
# u-boot-imx8qxp-c0.imx
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qxp-
c0:imx8qxp_mek_androidauto_trusty_defconfig
# bootloader-imx8qxp-secure-unlock.img and spl-imx8qxp-secure-unlock.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qxp-secure-
unlock:imx8qxp_mek_androidauto_trusty_secure_unlock_defconfig
# u-boot-imx8qm.imx
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG := imx8qm:imx8qm_mek_android_defconfig
# u-boot-imx8qxp.imx
```

```

TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qxp:imx8qxp_mek_android_defconfig
# bootloader-imx8qm-dual.img and spl-imx8qm-dual.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qm-dual:imx8qm_mek_android_dual_defconfig
# bootloader-imx8qxp-dual.img and spl-imx8qxp-dual.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qxp-dual:imx8qxp_mek_android_dual_defconfig
# u-boot-imx8qm-hdmi.imx
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qm-hdmi:imx8qm_mek_android_hdmi_defconfig
# u-boot-imx8qxp-c0.imx
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qxp-c0:imx8qxp_mek_android_defconfig
# u-boot-imx8qm-md.imx
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qm-md:imx8qm_mek_android_hdmi_defconfig
# bootloader-imx8qxp-c0-dual.img and spl-imx8qxp-c0-dual.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qxp-c0-
dual:imx8qxp_mek_android_dual_defconfig
# u-boot-imx8dx.imx
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8dx:imx8dx_mek_android_defconfig
# u-boot-imx8dx-mek-uuu.imx
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8dx-mek-uuu:imx8dx_mek_android_uuu_defconfig
# bootloader-imx8qm-trusty-dual.img and spl-imx8qm-trusty-dual.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qm-trusty-
dual:imx8qm_mek_android_trusty_dual_defconfig
# bootloader-imx8qxp-trusty-dual.img and spl-imx8qm-trusty-dual.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qxp-trusty-
dual:imx8qxp_mek_android_trusty_dual_defconfig
# bootloader-imx8qm-trusty-secure-unlock-dual.img and spl-imx8qm-trusty-
secure-unlock-dual.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qm-trusty-secure-unlock-
dual:imx8qm_mek_android_trusty_secure_unlock_dual_defconfig
# bootloader-imx8qxp-trusty-c0-dual.img and spl-imx8qxp-trusty-c0-dual.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qxp-trusty-c0-
dual:imx8qxp_mek_android_trusty_dual_defconfig
# bootloader-imx8qxp-trusty-secure-unlock-dual.img and spl-imx8qxp-trusty-
secure-unlock-dual.bin
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qxp-trusty-secure-unlock-
dual:imx8qxp_mek_android_trusty_secure_unlock_dual_defconfig
# u-boot-imx8qm-mek-uuu.imx
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qm-mek-uuu:imx8qm_mek_android_uuu_defconfig
# u-boot-imx8qxp-mek-uuu.imx
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8qxp-mek-uuu:imx8qxp_mek_android_uuu_defconfig

```

The defconfig file name can be used to locate the layout information of containers. Search for the defconfig file name in the generated make_android.txt file. A line prompts that the build process for that defconfig file has been finished. The container and container signature block offset can be found in several lines before this line.

For the single-bootloader condition, take u-boot-imx8qm.imx with the defconfig file of imx8qm_mek_android_defconfig as an example. The following information should be retrieved in the log file. The first two lines are for the intermediate file u-boot-atf-container.img. This file is the third container that has Arm Trusted Firmware and U-Boot proper in it. The layout information in the following two lines is for another intermediate file, which has the second container in it. This intermediate file is padded to 1 kB aligned boundary, and then u-boot-atf-container.img is appended to this file. Therefore, the second two lines can be directly used, while the first two lines should be added with an offset. It is 388kB, 0x61000 in hexadecimal, and then the offset of the third container in the final u-boot-imx8qm.imx is 0x61000. Its signature offset in the file is 0x61000+0x190=0x61190.

```

CST: CONTAINER 0 offset: 0x0
CST: CONTAINER 0: Signature Block: offset is at 0x190
...
CST: CONTAINER 0 offset: 0x400
CST: CONTAINER 0: Signature Block: offset is at 0x610

```

```
...
append u-boot-atf-container.img at 388 KB
...
===== Finish building imx8qm:imx8qm_mek_android_defconfig
=====
```

For the dual-bootloader condition, take `bootloader-imx8qm-trusty-dual.img` and `spl-imx8qm-trusty-dual.bin` with the defconfig file of `imx8qm_mek_android_trusty_dual_defconfig` as an example. The following information should be retrieved in the log file. The layout information of the first two lines is for `bootloader-imx8qm-trusty-dual.img`, and the information in the following two lines are for `spl-imx8qm-trusty-dual.bin`. The unrelated lines are omitted and represented with ellipsis.

```
CST: CONTAINER 0 offset: 0x0
CST: CONTAINER 0: Signature Block: offset is at 0x190
...
CST: CONTAINER 0 offset: 0x400
CST: CONTAINER 0: Signature Block: offset is at 0x610
...
=====Finish building
imx8qm:imx8qm_mek_android_trusty_dual_defconfig =====
```

The following table lists a summary of the offsets of container and container signature.

Table 2. Container offset information

Files having container to be signed	Container offset in the file	Container signature block offset
<code>bootloader-imx8qm-trusty-dual.img</code>	0x0	0x190
<code>spl-imx8qm-trusty-dual.bin</code>	0x400	0x610
<code>u-boot-imx8qm.img</code>	0x400 0x61000	0x610 0x61190

The same rule can be used on other targets, such as the UUU U-Boot targets, so the target configuration files `imx8qm_mek_android_uuu_defconfig`, `imx8ulp_evk_android_uuu_defconfig`, and `imx95_evk_android_uuu_defconfig` should follow the same rule as `u-boot-imx8qm.img`.

6. Sign the image files.

Copy the files to be signed to the directory of `linux64/bin/` in Code Signing Tool (CST) directory. The binary file named `cst` is used to sign these files. This `cst` needs the CSF description file to be as an input file when it is executed. CSF examples are in the directory of `${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/doc/imx/ahab/csf_examples/`. The second and third containers need to be signed, so copy the CSF description file `cst_uboot_atf.txt` twice to the Code Signing Tool (CST) `linux64/bin/` directory, and name them as `csf_uboot_first.txt` and `csf_uboot_second.txt` respectively.

Go through the CSF description files, correct parameters must be filled, including the AHAB versions (1.0 or 2.0) and certificates path. Otherwise, the signing process will fail.

For the single-bootloader condition, take `u-boot-imx8qm.img` as an example. Modify the copied `csf_uboot_first.txt` file as follows:

```
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ Version = 1.0

[Install SRK]
# SRK table generated by srktool
-File = "../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
+File = "../../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
# Public key certificate in PEM format on this example only using SRK key
-Source = "../crts/SRK1_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr crt.pem"
+Source = "../../crts/SRK1_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr crt.pem"
```

```
# Index of the public key certificate within the SRK table (0 .. 3)
Source index = 0
# Type of SRK set (NXP or OEM)
@@ -16,6 +16,6 @@ Revocations = 0x0

[Authenticate Data]
# Binary to be signed generated by mkimage
-File = "u-boot-atf-container.img"
+File = "u-boot-imx8qm.img"
# Offsets = Container header Signature block (printed out by mkimage)
-Offsets = 0x0 0x110
+Offsets = 0x400 0x610
```

Modify the `csf_uboot_second.txt` file as follows:

```
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ Version = 1.0

[Install SRK]
# SRK table generated by srktool
-File = "../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
+File = "../../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
# Public key certificate in PEM format on this example only using SRK key
-Source = "../crts/SRK1_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr crt.pem"
+Source = "../../crts/SRK1_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr crt.pem"
# Index of the public key certificate within the SRK table (0 .. 3)
Source index = 0
# Type of SRK set (NXP or OEM)
@@ -16,6 +16,6 @@ Revocations = 0x0

[Authenticate Data]
# Binary to be signed generated by mkimage
-File = "u-boot-atf-container.img"
+File = "first-signed-u-boot-imx8qm.img"
# Offsets = Container header Signature block (printed out by mkimage)
-Offsets = 0x0 0x110
+Offsets = 0x61000 0x61190
```

For i.MX 95, it uses "container" version 2 and hybrid key, so the following two items in the CSF file should be set to:

```
Target = AHAB
Version = 2.0
...
...
Source = "../../crts/SRK1_sha384_p384_dilithium3_v3_ca crt.pem"
...
...
```

Then, execute the following commands one by one:

```
$ ./cst -i csf_uboot_first.txt -o first-signed-u-boot-imx8qm.img
$ ./cst -i csf_uboot_second.txt -o second-signed-u-boot-imx8qm.img
```

With preceding command successfully executed, `second-signed-u-boot-imx8qm.img` is generated. Copy it back to the output directory, and change its name as before. This signed single-bootloader image is then ready for use. In addition, the UUU U-Boot targets, such as `u-boot-imx8qm-mek-uuu.img`, can be signed by using this method.

For the dual-bootloader condition, take `bootloader-imx8qm-trusty-dual.img` and `spl-imx8qm-trusty-dual.bin` as example. Modify the `csf_uboot_first.txt` as follows:

```
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ Version = 1.0
```

```
[Install SRK]
# SRK table generated by srktool
-File = "../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
+File = "../../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
# Public key certificate in PEM format on this example only using SRK key
-Source = "../crts/SRK1_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr crt.pem"
+Source = "../../crts/SRK1_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr crt.pem"
# Index of the public key certificate within the SRK table (0 .. 3)
Source index = 0
# Type of SRK set (NXP or OEM)
@@ -16,6 +16,6 @@ Revocations = 0x0

[Authenticate Data]
# Binary to be signed generated by mkimage
-File = "u-boot-atf-container.img"
+File = "spl-imx8qm-trusty-dual.bin"
# Offsets = Container header Signature block (printed out by mkimage)
-Offsets = 0x0 0x110
+Offsets = 0x400 0x610
```

Modify the `csf_uboot_second.txt` file as follows:

```
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ Version = 1.0

[Install SRK]
# SRK table generated by srktool
-File = "../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
+File = "../../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
# Public key certificate in PEM format on this example only using SRK key
-Source = "../crts/SRK1_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr crt.pem"
+Source = "../../crts/SRK1_sha384_secp384r1_v3_usr crt.pem"
# Index of the public key certificate within the SRK table (0 .. 3)
Source index = 0
# Type of SRK set (NXP or OEM)
@@ -16,6 +16,6 @@ Revocations = 0x0

[Authenticate Data]
# Binary to be signed generated by mkimage
-File = "u-boot-atf-container.img"
+File = "bootloader-imx8qm-trusty-dual.img"
# Offsets = Container header Signature block (printed out by mkimage)
-Offsets = 0x0 0x110
+Offsets = 0x0 0x190
```

Similarly, for the i.MX 95, modify the "container" version and hybrid key in the CSF description files.

Then, execute the following commands:

```
$ ./cst -i csf_uboot_first.txt -o signed-spl-imx8qm-trusty-dual.bin
$ ./cst -i csf_uboot_second.txt -o signed-bootloader-imx8qm-trusty-dual.img
```

With preceding command successfully executed, `signed-spl-imx8qm-trusty-dual.bin` and `signed-bootloader-imx8qm-trusty-dual.img` are generated. Copy them back to the output directory and change their name as before. These signed dual-bootloader images are then ready for use. Images are signed now. When booting with signed images, the SRK table embedded in the image file is used to verify the signature. The embedded SRK table is verified based on its hash value. The hash value is programmed in OTP eFuse in i.MX chips, so it is not tempered by others. Perform the following steps to fuse the SRK hash value.

7. Dump the SRK hash value.

Change the directory to `crt`s/ in Code Signing Tool (CST). For i.MX 8Quad platforms, execute the following command to dump the SRK hash value:

```
$ od -t x4 SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin
0000000 d436cc46 8ecccda9 b89e1601 5fada3db
0000020 d454114a b6cd51f4 77384870 c50ee4b2
0000040 a27e5132 eba887cf 592c1e2b bb501799
0000060 ee702e07 cf8ce73e fb55e2d5 eba6bbd2
```

On i.MX 8ULP, the SRK Hash uses SHA-256 and dump 8 words fuses:

```
$ od -t x4 SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin
0000000 db2959f2 90dfc39c 53394566 e0b75829
0000020 85e6f3b1 af00983d e5e804fe 7a451024
```

On i.MX 95, besides SRK Hash, the PQC SRK Hash should also be fused. Execute the following commands to dump the SRK Hash and the PQC SRK Hash:

```
$ od -t x4 SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin
0000000 9877f622 59af1604 5938d24a 2db2f32e
0000020 d40064ff c0342cfc d16f595b 4ded11d5
0000040 411ef0a2 8ede1b16 3a4c87bb 6ccb39ec
0000060 82d20cc7 c5fc2a30 86f02fee a7020380
0000100 10fff7f3 1a9d2414 ee80a0e4 0e395b58
0000120 f85ec04f 0f8f4037 b75aa5f4 5084c643
0000140 ff7dc0ca 4cca329a b9b48cb0 1d29035d
0000160 adf0edfc 978ddff1 542eb17b ec5851d2
```

8. Use the U-Boot fuse command to fuse the hash value to a chip.

Because the fuse command is removed from U-Boot for Android Auto images to shorten the boot time, use UUU to load the U-Boot used by UUU to RAM, and then use the fuse command.

Change the board to serial download mode, and execute the following command to download U-Boot to RAM. It then enters fastboot mode.

For i.MX 8QuadMax, it is as follows:

```
$ sudo ./uuu_imx_android_flash.sh -f imx8qm -i
```

For i.MX 8QuadXPlus, it is as follows:

```
$ sudo ./uuu_imx_android_flash.sh -f imx8qxp -i
```

For i.MX 8ULP, it is as follows:

```
$ sudo ./uuu_imx_android_flash.sh -f imx8ulp -i
```

For i.MX 95, it is as follows:

```
$ $ sudo ./uuu_imx_android_flash.sh -f imx95 -i
```

With the commands above executed, U-Boot used by UUU under the current working directory is loaded to RAM on board and it enters fastboot mode.

On the U-Boot console, it shows that U-Boot is in fastboot mode. Press **CTRL+C** to exit fastboot mode and enter U-Boot command mode.

For i.MX 8QuadMax, execute the following commands on the U-Boot console:

```
=> fuse prog 0 722 0xd436cc46
=> fuse prog 0 723 0x8ecccda9
=> fuse prog 0 724 0xb89e1601
=> fuse prog 0 725 0x5fada3db
=> fuse prog 0 726 0xd454114a
=> fuse prog 0 727 0xb6cd51f4
=> fuse prog 0 728 0x77384870
=> fuse prog 0 729 0xc50ee4b2
```

```
=> fuse prog 0 730 0xa27e5132
=> fuse prog 0 731 0xeba887cf
=> fuse prog 0 732 0x592c1e2b
=> fuse prog 0 733 0xbb501799
=> fuse prog 0 734 0xee702e07
=> fuse prog 0 735 0xcf8ce73e
=> fuse prog 0 736 0xfb55e2d5
=> fuse prog 0 737 0xeba6bbd2
```

For i.MX 8QuadXPlus, execute the following commands on the U-Boot console:

```
=> fuse prog 0 730 0xd436cc46
=> fuse prog 0 731 0x8ecccda9
=> fuse prog 0 732 0xb89e1601
=> fuse prog 0 733 0x5fada3db
=> fuse prog 0 734 0xd454114a
=> fuse prog 0 735 0xb6cd51f4
=> fuse prog 0 736 0x77384870
=> fuse prog 0 737 0xc50ee4b2
=> fuse prog 0 738 0xa27e5132
=> fuse prog 0 739 0xeba887cf
=> fuse prog 0 740 0x592c1e2b
=> fuse prog 0 741 0xbb501799
=> fuse prog 0 742 0xee702e07
=> fuse prog 0 743 0xcf8ce73e
=> fuse prog 0 744 0xfb55e2d5
=> fuse prog 0 745 0xeba6bbd2
```

For i.MX 8ULP, execute the following commands on the U-Boot console:

```
=> fuse prog 15 0 0xdb2959f2
=> fuse prog 15 1 0x90dfc39c
=> fuse prog 15 2 0x53394566
=> fuse prog 15 3 0xe0b75829
=> fuse prog 15 4 0x85e6f3b1
=> fuse prog 15 5 0xaf00983d
=> fuse prog 15 6 0xe5e804fe
=> fuse prog 15 7 0x7a451024
```

For i.MX 95, both SRK Hash and PQC SRK hash should be programmed. Execute the following commands on the U-Boot console:

```
=> fuse prog 16 0 0x9877F622
=> fuse prog 16 1 0x59AF1604
=> fuse prog 16 2 0x5938D24A
=> fuse prog 16 3 0x2DB2F32E
=> fuse prog 16 4 0xD40064FF
=> fuse prog 16 5 0xC0342CFC
=> fuse prog 16 6 0xD16F595B
=> fuse prog 16 7 0x4DED11D5
=> fuse prog 17 0 0x411EF0A2
=> fuse prog 17 1 0x8EDE1B16
=> fuse prog 17 2 0x3A4C87BB
=> fuse prog 17 3 0x6CCB39EC
=> fuse prog 17 4 0x82D20CC7
=> fuse prog 17 5 0xC5FC2A30
=> fuse prog 17 6 0x86F02FEE
=> fuse prog 17 7 0xA7020380

=> fuse prog 56 0 0x10FFF7F3
=> fuse prog 56 1 0x1A9D2414
=> fuse prog 56 2 0xEE80A0E4
```

```
=> fuse prog 56 3 0x0E395B58
=> fuse prog 56 4 0xF85EC04F
=> fuse prog 56 5 0x0F8F4037
=> fuse prog 56 6 0xB75AA5F4
=> fuse prog 56 7 0x5084C643
=> fuse prog 57 0 0xFF7DC0CA
=> fuse prog 57 1 0x4CCA329A
=> fuse prog 57 2 0xB9B48CB0
=> fuse prog 57 3 0x1D29035D
=> fuse prog 57 4 0xADF0EDFC
=> fuse prog 57 5 0x978DDFF1
=> fuse prog 57 6 0x542EB17B
=> fuse prog 57 7 0xEC5851D2
```

Now, images are signed and the SRK hash value is fused. The images can be flashed to boards. For how to flash i.MX Android images, see the *Android Release Notes* (RN00201).

The chip is now in the open stage, and the verification failure does not block the boot process. To make sure that the SRK hash value is correctly fused and images are correctly signed, check the HAB event during boot. After `CONFIG_AHAB_BOOT` is enabled in the `defconfig` file of U-Boot, use a U-Boot command to check the HAB events. After images are signed and the SRK hash value is programmed, boot the board to U-Boot command mode. On the U-Boot console, execute the following command:

```
=> ahab_status
```

If the preceding command outputs the HAB event, use the following code to check whether it is related to AHAB verification.

```
0x0087EE00 = The container image is not signed.
0x0087FA00 = The container image was signed with wrong key that is not
              matching the OTP SRK hashes.
```

For example, if the SRK hash value is programmed, but images are not signed, after `ahab_status` is executed, the following prompt is displayed on the console:

```
=> ahab_status
Lifecycle: 0x0020, NXP closed
SECO Event[0] = 0x0087EE00
CMD = AHAB_AUTH_CONTAINER_REQ (0x87)
IND = AHAB_NO_AUTHENTICATION_IND (0xEE)
SECO Event[1] = 0x0087EE00
CMD = AHAB_AUTH_CONTAINER_REQ (0x87)
IND = AHAB_NO_AUTHENTICATION_IND (0xEE)
```

After it is confirmed that the SRK hash value is correctly fused, and signed images do not cause AHAB-related events, execute the following command on the U-Boot console to close the chip:

```
=> ahab_close
```

Note:

*This close operation is **irreversible** to the chips and the closed chips do not boot up if AHAB verification fails.*

In addition, a power-on reset is needed to make the operations above take effect.

3.1.2 Secure boot with HABv4

HABv4 verifies images based on Image Vector Table (IVT) and Flattened Image Tree (FIT). Detailed information of the boot image format can be found in the Reference Manual of specific chips. According to the Reference manual, the sign process described below embeds the Command Sequence File (CSF) generated by the code signing tool in the final image. The CSF is used to verify the images during the boot time.

There are three kinds of layouts. The following takes i.MX 8M Mini as an example to describe the different layouts of images.

The UUU U-Boot images of i.MX 8M platforms are constructed by SPL and FIT. The FIT structure contains the Arm Trusted Firmware and U-Boot proper. It is constructed in build time and is appended to the end of the SPL image. Taking `u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx` as an example, its high-level layout structure is shown in the following figure.




Figure 6. Layout structure for u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx

For single-bootloader condition, the U-Boot images of i.MX 8M have no structural differences from UUU U-Boot images, except for the difference in the functional configuration. Taking `u-boot-imx8mm.imx` as an example, the following figure shows the layout structure.




Figure 7. Layout structure for u-boot-imx8mm.imx

For dual-bootloader condition, take `spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin` and `bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img` as an example. U-Boot is split into SPL and FIT images in this case. The following figure shows the layout structure.




Figure 8. Layout structure for spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin and bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img

To sign the images for i.MX 8M devices, perform the steps in the following sections.

3.1.2.1 Getting CST tool and keys configuration

1. Download Code Signing Tool (CST) by searching for "IMX_CST_TOOL_NEW" from [nxp.com](https://www.nxp.com). Decompress the package with the following command:

```
$ tar zxvf IMX_CST_TOOL_NEW.tgz
```

2. Generate the HABv4 PKI tree.

After the tool package is decompressed, enter the directory of `${CST}/keys/`, and execute the following command:

```
../linux64/bin/hab4_pki_tree
```

Then enter some parameters based on the output of this script. An example is as follows:

```
Do you want to use an existing CA key (y/n)? : n
```

```

Key type options (confirm targeted device supports desired key type):
Select the key type (possible values: rsa, rsa-pss, ecc) : rsa
Enter key length in bits for PKI tree (possible values: 2048, 3072, 4096) :
2048
Enter PKI tree duration (years): 10
How many Super Root Keys should be generated ? : 4
Do you want the SRK certificates to have the CA flag set? (y/n) : y

```

3. Generate HABv4 SRK tables and eFuse hash.

Enter the directory of `${CST}/crts/`, and execute the following command:

```

$ ../linux64/bin/srktool -h 4 -t SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin -e \
SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin -d sha256 -c \
SRK1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_ca.crt.pem,\
SRK2_sha256_2048_65537_v3_ca.crt.pem,\
SRK3_sha256_2048_65537_v3_ca.crt.pem,\
SRK4_sha256_2048_65537_v3_ca.crt.pem

```

After the preceding commands are executed successfully. The SRK table and its SHA256 value are generated and saved respectively in two files under `${CST}/crts/`.

The SRK table is embedded in the CSF. Therefore, during the boot time, it can be used to verify the signature. The SRK table SHA256 value is fused to the OTP eFuse hardware and works as the "secure root key". It is used to verify the SRK table in CSF.

Files generated in `${CST}/keys/` and `/release/crts/` are very important. If the SRK HASH value is fused to the chip and then changes the chip from open to close state, the board can only boot with images signed with these files.

If you are a user of both i.MX 8Quad and i.MX 8M devices, use two copies of this CST respectively for two device families, since this process generates files with the same names in the same directory, while these files should be prevented from being overwritten.

4. Dump the SRK hash value.

Change directory to `crts/` in Code Signing Tool (CST). Execute the following command to dump the SRK hash value:

```

hexdump -e '/4 "0x"' -e '/4 "%X""\n"' SRK_1_2_3_4_fuse.bin
0x20593752
0x6ACE6962
0x26E0D06C
0xFC600661
0x1240E88F
0x1209F144
0x831C8117
0x1190FD4D

```

5. Use the U-Boot fuse command to fuse the hash value to a chip.

Flash the image just signed to the board, and then boot to U-Boot command mode, and execute the following command to fuse the SRK hash value. This is the same for i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Quad, and i.MX 8M Plus.

```

fuse prog -y 6 0 0x20593752 0x6ACE6962 0x26E0D06C 0xFC600661
fuse prog -y 7 0 0x1240E88F 0x1209F144 0x831C8117 0x1190FD4D

```

3.1.2.2 Signing bootloader images

1. Build Android images to generate the file to be signed.

To support HAB features, enable `CONFIG_IMX_HAB` configurations in the corresponding defconfig files in U-Boot code. They are not enabled by default. Taking i.MX 8M Mini EVK and i.MX 8M Nano EVK as an example, the files are:

```
imx8mm-evk-android-defconfig
imx8mm-evk-android-dual-defconfig
imx8mm-evk-android-trusty-secure-unlock-dual-defconfig
imx8mm-evk-android-trusty-dual-defconfig
imx8mm-evk-android-uuu-defconfig
```

Layout information of the final U-Boot image is needed during the signing process. When building the Android images, save the log information of build system. For example, execute the following command:

```
$ ./imx-make.sh -j12 2>&1 | tee make_android.txt
```

During the build process, the build system output information is also saved in `make_android.txt`.

2. Get the layout information of the file to be signed.

Final U-Boot image files are generated with different U-Boot defconfig files. Taking i.MX 8M Mini as an example, different U-Boot compilation targets with different U-Boot defconfig files can be found in `${MY_ANDROID}/device/nxp/imx8m/evk_8mm/BoardConfig.mk`. They are listed below with some annotations.

```
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG := imx8mm:imx8mm-evk-android-defconfig
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8mm-dual:imx8mm-evk-android-dual-defconfig
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8mm-trusty-secure-unlock-
dual:imx8mm-evk-android-trusty-secure-unlock-dual-defconfig
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8mm-trusty-
dual:imx8mm-evk-android-trusty-dual-defconfig
TARGET_BOOTLOADER_CONFIG += imx8mm-evk-uuu:imx8mm-evk-android-uuu-defconfig
```

Search the defconfig file name in the log of `make_android.txt` just generated for a line prompt that the build process for that defconfig file is finished. The layout information needed in the signing process is several lines before that. The layout information needs to be categorized based on whether dual-bootloader is enabled. The defconfig files with "dual" substring in their names have dual-bootloader enabled. On the contrary, the ones without "dual" substring in their names do not enable dual-bootloader.

For the single bootloader condition, taking `imx8mm-evk-android-uuu-defconfig` as an example, its corresponding output file is `u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx`. The lines directly related to the layout info of this output file are listed below, and unrelated lines are omitted and represented with ellipsis.

```
Loader IMAGE:
...
csf_off                0x2ea00
spl_hab_block:         0x7e0fc0 0x0 0x2ea00
...
Second Loader IMAGE:
sld_header_off         0x57c00
sld_csf_off            0x58c20
sld_hab_block:         0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x1020
fit-fdt csf_off        0x5ac20
fit-fdt hab_block:     0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x3020
...
0x40200000 0x5CC00 0x108548
0x40308548 0x165148 0xE5E8
0x920000 0x173730 0xA8E0
...
=====Finish building imx8mm-evk-
uuu:imx8mm-evk-android-uuu-defconfig =====
```

For the dual-bootloader condition, taking `imx8mm-evk-android-trusty-dual-defconfig` as an example, its corresponding output files are `spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin` and `bootloader-imx8mm-`

trusty-dual.img. The lines directly related to the layout information of this output file are listed below, and the unrelated lines are omitted and represented with ellipsis.

```
Loader IMAGE:
...
csf_off                0x34600
spl_hab block:         0x7e0fc0 0x0 0x34600
...
FIT IVT IMAGE:
fit_csf_off            0x1020
fit_hab block:         0x401fadc0 0x0 0x1020
fit-fdt_csf_off        0x3020
fit-fdt_hab block:     0x401fadc0 0x0 0x3020
...
0x40200000 0x5000 0x11CA50
0x4031CA50 0x121A50 0xE5F0
0x920000 0x130040 0xDB30
0xBE000000 0x13DB70 0x191A00
...
=====Finish building imx8mm-trusty-
dual:imx8mm_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig =====
```

The same method of retrieving the layout information can be used on other targets.

3. Sign the image files.

Copy the files to be signed to the directory of `linux64/bin/` in Code Signing Tool (CST) directory, the binary file named `cst` is used to sign these files. This `cst` needs the CSF description file to be an input file when it is executed. CSF description file examples are in the directory of `${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/doc/imx/habv4/csf_examples/mx8m/`. Copy `csf_fit.txt`, `csf_spl.txt` and `csf_fit_fdt.txt` to Code Signing Tool (CST) `linux64/bin/`. The file to be signed also needs to be copied to this directory. The signing process is different between the single-bootloader condition and dual-bootloader condition. The examples of the two conditions are described in this section, but in practice, different U-Boot target files should be signed with the following steps one by one. For the single-bootloader example with `imx8mm_evk_android_uuu_defconfig` defconfig file, modify the copied `csf_fit.txt`, `csf_spl.txt` and `csf_fit_fdt.txt` as follows.

```
diff --git a/csf_fit.txt b/csf_fit.txt
index d9218ab..df0ded 100644
--- a/csf_fit.txt
+++ b/csf_fit.txt
@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@

[Install SRK]
# Index of the key location in the SRK table to be installed
- File = "../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
+ File = "../../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
  Source index = 0

[Install CSFK]
# Key used to authenticate the CSF data
- File = "../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"
+ File = "../../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"

[Authenticate CSF]

@@ -23,14 +23,14 @@
# Target key slot in HAB key store where key will be installed
Target index = 2
# Key to install
- File = "../crts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"
```

```

+   File = "../../../crtts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"

[Authenticate Data]
    # Key slot index used to authenticate the image data
    Verification index = 2
    # Authenticate Start Address, Offset, Length and file
-   Blocks = 0x401fcdc0 0x057c00 0x01020 "flash.bin", \
-           0x40200000 0x05AC00 0x9AAC8 "flash.bin", \
-           0x00910000 0x0F56C8 0x09139 "flash.bin", \
-           0xFE000000 0xFE804 0x4D268 "flash.bin", \
-           0x4029AAC8 0x14BA6C 0x06DCF "flash.bin"
+   Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x1020 "u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx", \
+           0x40200000 0x5CC00 0x108548 "u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx", \
+           0x40308548 0x165148 0xE5E8 "u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx", \
+           0x920000 0x173730 0xA8E0 "u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx"
diff --git a/csf_fit_fdt.txt b/csf_fit_fdt.txt
index dd88843dee..21498de8b9 100644
--- a/csf_fit_fdt.txt
+++ b/csf_fit_fdt.txt
@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@

[Install SRK]
    # Index of the key location in the SRK table to be installed
-   File = "../crtts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
+   File = "../../../crtts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
    Source index = 0

[Install CSF]
    # Key used to authenticate the CSF data
-   File = "../crtts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"
+   File = "../../../crtts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"

[Authenticate CSF]

@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
    # Target key slot in HAB key store where key will be installed
    Target index = 2
    # Key to install
-   File = "../crtts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"
+   File = "../../../crtts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"

[Authenticate Data]
    # Key slot index used to authenticate the image data
    Verification index = 2
    # Authenticate Start Address, Offset, Length and file
-   Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x3020 "signed-flash.bin"
+   Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x3020 "u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx"
diff --git a/csf_spl.txt b/csf_spl.txt
index 39adf7a..80165a8 100644
--- a/csf_spl.txt
+++ b/csf_spl.txt
@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@

[Install SRK]
    # Index of the key location in the SRK table to be installed
-   File = "../crtts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
+   File = "../../../crtts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
    Source index = 0

[Install CSFK]

```

```

    # Key used to authenticate the CSF data
-   File = "../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"
+   File = "../../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"

[Authenticate CSF]

[Unlock]
    # Leave Job Ring and DECO master ID registers Unlocked
    Engine = CAAM
-   Features = MID
+   Features = MID, MFG

[Install Key]
    # Key slot index used to authenticate the key to be installed
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@
    # Target key slot in HAB key store where key will be installed
    Target index = 2
    # Key to install
-   File = "../crts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"
+   File = "../../crts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"

[Authenticate Data]
    # Key slot index used to authenticate the image data
    Verification index = 2
    # Authenticate Start Address, Offset, Length and file
-   Blocks = 0x7e0fc0 0x1a000 0x2a600 "flash.bin"
+   Blocks = 0x7e0fc0 0x0 0x2ea00 "u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx"

```

For the dual-bootloader example with `imx8mm-evk-android-trusty-dual-defconfig` defconfig file, modify the copied `csf_fit.txt`, `csf_spl.txt` and `csf_fit_fdt.txt` as follows.

```

diff --git a/csf_fit.txt b/csf_fit.txt
index d9218ab..dfd0ded 100644
--- a/csf_fit.txt
+++ b/csf_fit.txt
@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@

[Install SRK]
    # Index of the key location in the SRK table to be installed
-   File = "../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
+   File = "../../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
    Source index = 0

[Install CSFK]
    # Key used to authenticate the CSF data
-   File = "../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"
+   File = "../../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"

[Authenticate CSF]

@@ -23,14 +23,14 @@
    # Target key slot in HAB key store where key will be installed
    Target index = 2
    # Key to install
-   File = "../crts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"
+   File = "../../crts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"

[Authenticate Data]
    # Key slot index used to authenticate the image data
    Verification index = 2
    # Authenticate Start Address, Offset, Length and file

```

```

-   Blocks = 0x401fcdc0 0x057c00 0x01020 "flash.bin", \
-           0x40200000 0x05AC00 0x9AAC8 "flash.bin", \
-           0x00910000 0x0F56C8 0x09139 "flash.bin", \
-           0xFE000000 0xFE804 0x4D268 "flash.bin", \
-           0x4029AAC8 0x14BA6C 0x06DCF "flash.bin"
+   Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x0 0x1020 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img", \
+           0x40200000 0x5000 0x11CA50 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img",
\
+           0x4031CA50 0x121A50 0xE5F0 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img",
\
+           0x920000 0x130040 0xDB30 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img", \
+           0xBE000000 0x13DB70 0x191A00 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-
dual.img"
diff --git a/csf_fit_fdt.txt b/csf_fit_fdt.txt
index dd88843dee..21498de8b9 100644
--- a/csf_fit_fdt.txt
+++ b/csf_fit_fdt.txt
@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@

[Install SRK]
# Index of the key location in the SRK table to be installed
-   File = "../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
+   File = "../../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
    Source index = 0

[Install CSFK]
# Key used to authenticate the CSF data
-   File = "../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"
+   File = "../../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"

[Authenticate CSF]

@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
    # Target key slot in HAB key store where key will be installed
    Target index = 2
    # Key to install
-   File = "../crts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"
+   File = "../../crts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"

[Authenticate Data]
# Key slot index used to authenticate the image data
Verification index = 2
# Authenticate Start Address, Offset, Length and file
-   Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x3020 "signed-flash.bin"
+   Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x0 0x3020 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img"
diff --git a/csf_spl.txt b/csf_spl.txt
index 39adf7a..80165a8 100644
--- a/csf_spl.txt
+++ b/csf_spl.txt
@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@

[Install SRK]
# Index of the key location in the SRK table to be installed
-   File = "../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
+   File = "../../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
    Source index = 0

[Install CSFK]
# Key used to authenticate the CSF data
-   File = "../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr crt.pem"

```

```
+ File = "../../../crtcs/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr.crt.pem"

[Authenticate CSF]

[Unlock]
    # Leave Job Ring and DECO master ID registers Unlocked
    Engine = CAAM
-     Features = MID
+     Features = MID, MFG

[Install Key]
    # Key slot index used to authenticate the key to be installed
@@ -28,10 +28,10 @@
    # Target key slot in HAB key store where key will be installed
    Target index = 2
    # Key to install
- File = "../crtcs/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr.crt.pem"
+ File = "../../../crtcs/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr.crt.pem"

[Authenticate Data]
    # Key slot index used to authenticate the image data
    Verification index = 2
    # Authenticate Start Address, Offset, Length and file
- Blocks = 0x7e0fc0 0x1a000 0x2a600 "flash.bin"
+ Blocks = 0x7e0fc0 0x0 0x34600 "spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin"
```

Execute the following commands to generate CSF with the CSF description file. They are the same for single bootloader condition and dual-bootloader condition.

```
$ ./cst --i=csf_spl.txt --o=csf_spl.bin
$ ./cst --i=csf_fit.txt --o=csf_fit.bin
```

Execute the following commands to embed the CSF into the U-Boot image.

```
# For the single bootloader example with "imx8mm-evk-android-uuu-defconfig"
defconfig file
$ dd if=csf_spl.bin of=u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx seek=$((0x2ea00)) bs=1
conv=notrunc
$ dd if=csf_fit.bin of=u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx seek=$((0x58c20)) bs=1
conv=notrunc

# For the dual bootloader example with
"imx8mm-evk-android-trusty-dual-defconfig" defconfig file
$ dd if=csf_spl.bin of=spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin seek=$((0x34600)) bs=1
conv=notrunc
$ dd if=csf_fit.bin of=bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img seek=$((0x1020))
bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

After `csf_spl.bin` and `csf_fit.bin` are embedded, execute the following commands to generate CSF with the CSF description file for the FDT header. They are the same for single-bootloader condition and dual-bootloader condition.

```
./cst -i csf_fit_fdt.txt -o csf_fit_fdt.bin
```

Then execute the following commands to embed the FDT CSF into the U-Boot image.

```
# For the single bootloader example with "imx8mm-evk-android-uuu-defconfig"
defconfig file
$ dd if=csf_fit_fdt.bin of=u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx seek=$((0x5ac20)) bs=1
conv=notrunc
```

```
# For the dual bootloader example with
"imx8mm-evk-android-trusty-dual-defconfig" defconfig file
$ dd if=csf_fit_fdt.bin of=bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img seek=$((0x3020))
bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

With preceding commands successfully executed, `u-boot-imx8mm-evk-uuu.imx` or `spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin` and `bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img` are well signed. Then sign other images according to the description of the signing process.

Images are signed now. When booting with signed images, the SRK table embedded in the image file is used to verify the signature. Embedded SRK table is verified based on its hash value. The hash value is programmed in OTP eFuse in i.MX chips, so it is not affected by others.

3.1.2.3 Signing the MCU firmware

The MCU firmware on i.MX 8M is kicked off by the Cortex-A core. Its signature would be verified by HABv4. Some scripts are provided below to auto-sign the MCU firmware. Save these scripts to `linux64/bin/`.

1. Create a CSF template.

Save the following CSF template and rename it as `mcucsf_template`. This is the CSF file of the MCU firmware.

```
[Header]
  Version = 4.3
  Hash Algorithm = sha256
  Engine Configuration = 0
  Certificate Format = X509
  Signature Format = CMS
[Install SRK]
  File = "../../crts/SRK_1_2_3_4_table.bin"
  Source index = 0
[Install CSFK]
  File = "../../crts/CSF1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr.crt.pem"
[Authenticate CSF]
[Install Key]
  Verification index = 0
  Target index = 2
  File = "../../crts/IMG1_1_sha256_2048_65537_v3_usr.crt.pem"
[Authenticate Data]
  Verification index = 2
  Blocks = %addr_addr% 0x0 %auth_len% "mcu-pad-ivt.bin"
```

2. Create an IVT generation template.

Save the following IVT template and rename it as `genivt_template`. This script helps generate the IVT.

```
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
use strict;
open(my $out, '>:raw', 'ivt.bin') or die "Unable to open: $!";
print $out pack("V", 0x402000D1); # Signature
print $out pack("V", %jump_addr%); # Jump Location
print $out pack("V", 0x0); # Reserved
print $out pack("V", 0x0); # DCD pointer
print $out pack("V", 0x0); # Boot Data
print $out pack("V", %self_ptr%); # Self Pointer
print $out pack("V", %csf_ptr%); # CSF Pointer
print $out pack("V", 0x0); # Reserved
close($out);
```

3. Create a script `habmcugen_template`.

Save the following template and rename it as `habmcugen_template`. This script helps combine the generated images.

```
#!/bin/bash
echo "extend mcu image to %pad_len%..."
objcopy -I binary -O binary --pad-to %pad_len% --gap-fill=0x5A mcu.bin mcu-pad.bin
echo "generate IVT"
./genIVT
echo "attach IVT..."
cat mcu-pad.bin ivt.bin > mcu-pad-ivt.bin
echo "generate csf data..."
./cst --o mcu_csf.bin --i mcu.csf
echo "merge image and csf data..."
cat mcu-pad-ivt.bin mcu_csf.bin > mcu-signed.bin
echo "extend final image to %sig_len%..."
objcopy -I binary -O binary --pad-to %sig_len% --gap-fill=0x5A mcu-signed.bin mcu-signed-pad.bin
```

4. Create script `mk_secure_mcu_imx8m`.

Save the following script and rename it as `mk_secure_mcu_imx8m`. This script invokes all the scripts above and generates the final signed MCU image.

```
#!/bin/bash
let ddr_addr=$1
if [ ! -f mcu.bin ]
then
    printf "File \"mcu.bin\" does not exist.\n"
    exit 1
fi
# Calculate the size
let pad_len=$((0x20000)) # padding mcu image to 128KB
let auth_len=$((pad_len + 0x20)) # +0x20 "IVT"
let sig_len=$((auth_len + 0x2000))
let self_ptr=$((ddr_addr + pad_len))
let csf_ptr=$((ddr_addr + auth_len))
let jump_addr=$((ddr_addr))
# change value to hex string
pad_len=`printf "0x%X" ${pad_len}`
auth_len=`printf "0x%X" ${auth_len}`
sig_len=`printf "0x%X" ${sig_len}`
ddr_addr=`printf "0x%X" ${ddr_addr}`
self_ptr=`printf "0x%X" ${self_ptr}`
csf_ptr=`printf "0x%X" ${csf_ptr}`
jump_addr=`printf "0x%X" ${jump_addr}`
# Create habUimagegen
sed -e s/%pad_len%/${pad_len}/g -e s/%sig_len%/${sig_len}/g
habmcugen_template > habmcuGen
chmod +x habmcuGen
# Create mcu.csf
sed -e s/%ddr_addr%/${ddr_addr}/g -e s/%auth_len%/${auth_len}/g
mcucsf_template > mcu.csf
# Create genIVT
sed -e s/%jump_addr%/${jump_addr}/g -e s/%self_ptr%/${self_ptr}/g -e s/%csf_ptr%/${csf_ptr}/g genivt_template > genIVT
chmod +x genIVT
# Generate secure boot
./habmcuGen
# OK
printf "mcu image with Signature \"mcu-signed-pad.bin\" is ready to use.\n"
```

5. Generate the signed MCU firmware.

Copy the unsigned MCU firmware to `linux64/bin` and rename it as `mcu.bin`. Execute the following command to generate the final signed MCU firmware `mcu-signed-pad.bin`:

```
./mk_secure_mcu_imx8m <mcu-firmware-load-address>
```

As only TCM is supported to run the MCU firmware on the Android platform, so the `mcu-firmware-load-address` should be the load address in TCM like `0x7e0000`.

3.1.2.4 Closing the chip

With the steps above, the images are signed and SRK hash value is fused. But as the chip is in open stage, verification failure does not block the boot process. One way to make sure that SRK hash value is correctly fused and images are correctly signed is to check HAB events in the U-Boot log. Flash the images that are signed and reboot to U-Boot console, and execute the following command:

```
=> hab_status
```

Make sure there is no HAB EVENT reported. Before SPL invokes HAB to verify the FIT part, it first validates the CSF. Make sure there is no CSF-related error as follows in the boot log.

```
Error: CSF header command not found
```

After it is confirmed that the SRK hash value is correctly fused, and signed images do not cause HAB event, execute the following command on the U-Boot console to close the chip.

```
=> fuse prog -y 1 3 0x20000000
```

This close operation is **irreversible** to the chips and closed chips do not boot up if HABv4 verification fails.

3.1.3 Encrypted boot with AHAB

The encrypted boot image requires a Data Encryption Key (DEK) blob when AHAB is used to decrypt an image. AHAB is able to decrypt image containers by calling EdgeLock Secure Enclave (ELE) or SECO authentication functions. The image must be encrypted by CST and the resulted DEK must be encapsulated and included into the container signature block. To encrypt and sign the images for i.MX 8ULP, i.MX 8Quad, and i.MX 95 series devices, follow the steps below.

3.1.3.1 Image layout of bootloader

There are two kinds of boot image structures. Taking `imx8ulp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig` as an example, its corresponding output file is `u-boot-imx8ulp-trusty.imx`. The following diagram shows the structure of the output file.




Figure 9. Output file structure 1

Taking `imx8ulp_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig` as an example, its corresponding output files are `spl-imx8ulp-trusty-dual.bin` and `bootloader-imx8ulp-trusty-dual.img`. The following diagram shows the structure of the output files.




Figure 10. Output file structure 2

3.1.3.2 Enabling the encrypted boot support in CST

CST Version 3.0.0 and later have the encryption feature enabled by default. If using an earlier version, the encryption feature must be explicitly enabled. CST version 4.0.0 or above must be used for i.MX 95 to support PQC and hybrid key types.

For CST versions earlier than 3.0.0, the CST back-end must be recompiled. Execute the following commands to enable encryption support in CST:

```
$ sudo apt-get install libssl-dev openssl
$ cd <CST install directory>/code/back_end/src
$ gcc -o cst_encrypted -I ../hdr -L ../../linux64/lib *.c -lfrontend -lcrypto
$ cp cst_encrypted ../../linux64/bin/cst
```

3.1.3.3 Building Android images to construct the containers

For i.MX 8ULP and i.MX 95 series devices, additional U-Boot tools are needed. Enable the following features:

- Defconfig

```
CONFIG_CMD_DEKBLOB=y
CONFIG_AHAB_BOOT=y
CONFIG_IMX_ELE_DEK_ENCAP=y
```

For i.MX 8Quad series devices, enable the following features:

- Defconfig

```
CONFIG_CMD_DEKBLOB=y
CONFIG_AHAB_BOOT=y
CONFIG_IMX_SECO_DEK_ENCAP=y
```

The U-Boot image must be recompiled after these changes are made.

3.1.3.4 Recording the build log to get the layout information

The layout information of the final U-Boot image is needed during the signing and encrypting process. When building the Android images, save the log information of the build system. The mkimage log is used during the encrypted boot procedure to create the Command Sequence File (CSF).

- Single-bootloader condition

For the single bootloader condition, take `imx8ulp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig` as an example. The lines directly related to the layout info of this output file are listed below, and unrelated lines are omitted and represented with ellipsis.

```
CST: CONTAINER 0 offset: 0x0
CST: CONTAINER 0: Signature Block: offset is at 0x190
...
CST: CONTAINER 0 offset: 0x400
CST: CONTAINER 0: Signature Block: offset is at 0x590
...
append u-boot-atf-container.img at 317 KB
...
=====Finish building imx8ulp-trusty:imx8ulp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
=====
```

- Dual-bootloader condition

For the dual-bootloader condition, take `imx8ulp_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig` as an example. The lines directly related to the layout information of this output file are listed below, and the unrelated lines are omitted and represented with ellipsis.

```
CST: CONTAINER 0 offset: 0x0
CST: CONTAINER 0: Signature Block: offset is at 0x190
...
CST: CONTAINER 0 offset: 0x400
CST: CONTAINER 0: Signature Block: offset is at 0x590
...
=====Finish building imx8ulp-trusty-
dual:imx8ulp_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig =====
```

3.1.3.5 Creating the CSF description file for the SPL image

Copy the files to be signed to the directory of `linux64/bin/` in the Code Signing Tool (CST) directory. The binary file named CST is used to sign these files. This CST needs the CSF description file to be as an input file when it is executed. CSF description file examples are in the directory of `${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/doc/imx/ahab/csf_examples/`. Copy the file listed below to CST `linux64/bin/`:

```
csf_enc_boot_image.txt
```

The file to be signed also needs to be copied to this directory. The signing process is different between single-bootloader condition and dual-bootloader condition. The examples of the two conditions are described in the following sections, but in practice, different U-Boot target files should be signed with the following steps one by one.

- Single-bootloader condition

For the single-bootloader example with `imx8ulp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig` defconfig file, modify the CSF description file as follows to encrypt the U-Boot image for the first time and generate the `dek_spl.bin` file. The encrypted images are generated as `first-u-boot-imx8ulp-trusty.imx`. Execute the following command to copy the CSF description file:

```
$ cp csf_enc_boot_image.txt csf_enc_spl_image.txt
```

Then modify the file copied. Because the first container has been signed by NXP, this CSF description file is expected to apply on the second container. The offset entry should be filled as the second container.

```
[Authenticate Data]
# Binary to be signed generated by mkimage
File = "u-boot-imx8ulp-trusty.imx"
# Offsets = Container header   Signature block (printed out by mkimage)
Offsets   = 0x400             0x590

[Install Secret Key]
Key = "dek_spl.bin"
Key Length = 128
#Key Identifier = 0x1234CAFE
Image Indexes = 0xFFFFFFFF
```

For i.MX 95, it uses "container" version 2 and hybrid key, so the following two items in the CSF file should be set to:

```
Target = AHAB
Version = 2.0
...
...
Source = "../../../crts/SRK1_sha384_p384_dilithium3_v3_ca.crt.pem"
```

```
...
...
```

- Dual-bootloader condition

For the dual-bootloader example with the `imx8ulp-evk-android-trusty-dual-defconfig` defconfig file, it is very similar with single-bootloader condition. Modify the CSF description file as follows, and then the encrypted SPL images is generated as `spl-imx8ulp-trusty-dual-enc.bin`.

```
[Authenticate Data]
# Binary to be signed generated by mkimage
File = "spl-imx8ulp-trusty-dual.bin"
# Offsets = Container header  Signature block (printed out by mkimage)
Offsets   = 0x400              0x590

[Install Secret Key]
Key = "dek_spl.bin"
Key Length = 128
#Key Identifier = 0x1234CAFE
Image Indexes = 0xFFFFFFFF
```

For i.MX 95, it uses "container" version 2 and hybrid key, so the following two items in the CSF file should be set to:

```
Target = AHAB
Version = 2.0
...
...
Source = "../../../crts/SRK1_sha384_p384_dilithium3_v3_ca.crt.pem"
...
...
```

3.1.3.6 Encrypting and signing the SPL image

The image is encrypted using the Code Signing Tool. The tool generates the encrypted image and a `random_dek_spl.bin` file. CSF binary files are generated at the same time.

- Single-bootloader condition

```
$ ./cst -i csf_enc_spl_image.txt -o first-u-boot-imx8ulp-trusty.imx
The DEK BLOB must be inserted at offset 0x7c0 (its expected size is 72 bytes)
CSF Processed successfully and signed image available in first-u-boot-imx8ulp-trusty.imx
```

- Dual-bootloader condition

```
$ ./cst -i csf_enc_spl_image.txt -o spl-imx8ulp-trusty-dual-enc.bin
The DEK BLOB must be inserted at offset 0x7c0 (its expected size is 72 bytes)
CSF Processed successfully and signed image available in spl-imx8ulp-trusty-dual-enc.bin
```

The output log is used in a later step to insert the DEK blob into the signature block.

3.1.3.7 Creating the CSF description file for the bootloader image

- Single-bootloader condition

Similar to the SPL image, execute the following command to copy the CSF description file:

```
$ cp csf_enc_boot_image.txt csf_enc_bl_image.txt
```

imx-mkimage has printed the offset of u-boot-atf-container.img to append as follows:

```
imx-mkimage output:
append u-boot-atf-container.img at 317 KB
```

The offset to append u-boot-atf-container.img is 317 kB, 0x4F400 in hexadecimal. The offset of the third container header has been printed as 0x0, and the offset of the signature block has been printed as 0x190. The offset of the third container signature block in the final image can be calculated as follows:

```
Container header = 0x0 + 0x4f400 = 0x4f400
Signature block = 0x190 + 0x4f400 = 0x4f590
```

Then modify the file copied. This CSF description is expected to apply on the third container, encrypt the U-Boot image for the second time, and generate the dek_bl.bin file. The encrypted image is generated as second-u-boot-imx8ulp-trusty.imx.

```
[Unlock]
# Leave Job Ring and DECO master ID registers Unlocked
Features = MID, MFG

[Authenticate Data]
# Binary to be signed generated by mkimage
File = "first-u-boot-imx8ulp-trusty.imx"
# Offsets = Container header  Signature block (printed out by mkimage)
Offsets   = 0x4f400           0x4f590

[Install Secret Key]
Key = "dek_bl.bin"
Key Length = 128
#Key Identifier = 0x1234CAFE
Image Indexes = 0xFFFFFFFF
```

For i.MX 95, it uses "container" version 2 and hybrid key, so the following two items in the CSF file should be set to:

```
Target = AHAB
Version = 2.0
...
...
Source = "../../../crts/SRK1_sha384_p384_dilithium3_v3_ca.crt.pem"
...
...
```

- **Dual-bootloader condition**

It does not need to calculate the offset here because the container is in a separated file in this condition. Modify the CSF description file as follows. The encrypted image is generated as bootloader-imx8ulp-trusty-dual-enc.img.

```
[Unlock]
# Leave Job Ring and DECO master ID registers Unlocked
Features = MID, MFG

[Authenticate Data]
# Binary to be signed generated by mkimage
File = "bootloader-imx8ulp-trusty-dual.img"
# Offsets = Container header  Signature block (printed out by mkimage)
Offsets   = 0x0              0x190

[Install Secret Key]
Key = "dek_bl.bin"
Key Length = 128
#Key Identifier = 0x1234CAFE
```

```
Image Indexes = 0xFFFFFFFF
```

For i.MX 95, it uses "container" version 2 and hybrid key, so the following two items in the CSF file should be set to:

```
Target = AHAB
Version = 2.0
...
...
Source = "../../crtts/SRK1_sha384_p384_dilithium3_v3_ca.crt.pem"
...
...
```

3.1.3.8 Encrypting and signing the bootloader image

- Single-bootloader condition

For the single-bootloader condition, execute the following commands to generate the encrypted image and a random dek_blob_bl.bin file. The CSF binary files is generated at the same time.

```
./cst -i csf_enc_bl_image.txt -o second-u-boot-imx8ulp-trusty.img
The DEK BLOB must be inserted at offset 0x4f7c0 (its expected size is 72
bytes)
CSF Processed successfully and signed image available in second-u-boot-
imx8ulp-trusty.img
```

- Dual-bootloader condition

For the dual-bootloader condition, execute the following commands:

```
./cst -i csf_enc_bl_image.txt -o bootloader-imx8ulp-trusty-dual-enc.img
The DEK BLOB must be inserted at offset 0x3c0 (its expected size is 72
bytes)
CSF Processed successfully and signed image available in bootloader-
imx8ulp-trusty-dual-enc.img
```

3.1.3.9 Generating a DEK blob

The DEK must be encapsulated into a CAAM blob so that it can be included into the final encrypted binary. The U-Boot provides a fastboot command called `generate-dek-blob`, which calls the ELE or SECO blob encapsulation API. This command is only functional on a board with a closed configuration and signed images. See [Section 3.1.1](#) to generate secure boot images and correctly close the board. The following steps are the same for single-bootloader condition and dual-bootloader condition.

Boot the board and enter fastboot mode. Execute the following commands from the host PC:

```
fastboot stage dek_spl.bin
fastboot oem generate-dek-blob
fastboot get_staged dek_blob_spl.bin
fastboot stage dek_bl.bin
fastboot oem generate-dek-blob
fastboot get_staged dek_blob_bl.bin
```

3.1.3.10 Assembling the encrypted image

The DEK blob generated in the previous steps should be inserted into the container signature block.

- Single-bootloader condition

The following CSF log is used to determine the DEK blob offset in the second container:

```
The DEK BLOB must be inserted at offset 0x7c0 (its expected size is 72 bytes)
CSF Processed successfully and signed image available in first-u-boot-imx8ulp-
trusty.imx
```

1. Insert the DEK blob into the second container signature block:

```
dd if=dek_blob_spl.bin of=second-u-boot-imx8ulp-trusty.imx bs=1 seek=
$((0x7c0)) conv=notrunc
```

The following CSF log is used to determine the DEK blob offset in the third container:

```
The DEK BLOB must be inserted at offset 0x4f7c0 (its expected size is 72
bytes)
CSF Processed successfully and signed image available in second-u-boot-
imx8ulp-trusty.imx
```

2. Insert the DEK blob into the third container signature block:

```
dd if=dek_blob_bl.bin of=second-u-boot-imx8ulp-trusty.imx bs=1 seek=
$((0x4f7c0)) conv=notrunc
```

- Dual-bootloader condition

The following CSF log is used to determine the DEK blob offset in the second container of SPL image:

```
The DEK BLOB must be inserted at offset 0x7c0 (its expected size is 72 bytes)
CSF Processed successfully and signed image available in spl-imx8ulp-trusty-
dual-enc.bin
```

1. Insert the DEK blob into the second container signature block:

```
dd if=dek_blob_spl.bin of=spl-imx8ulp-trusty-dual-enc.bin bs=1 seek=
$((0x7c0)) conv=notrunc
```

2. The following CSF log is used to determine the DEK blob offset in the first container of bootloader image:

```
The DEK BLOB must be inserted at offset 0x3c0 (its expected size is 72
bytes)
CSF Processed successfully and signed image available in bootloader-imx8ulp-
trusty-dual-enc.img
```

3. Insert the DEK blob into the first container signature block:

```
dd if=dek_blob_bl.bin of=bootloader-imx8ulp-trusty-dual-enc.img bs=1 seek=
$((0x3c0)) conv=notrunc
```

3.1.3.11 Flashing encrypted boot image

With preceding command successfully executed, signed and encrypted images are generated. Copy them back to the output directory, change their names as before, and flash them to the corresponding partition. If everything is done correctly, the board boots successfully.

3.1.4 Encrypted boot with HABv4

The encrypted boot image requires a Data Encryption Key (DEK) blob when HABv4 is used to decrypt an image. The DEK blob is used as a security layer to wrap and store the DEK off-chip using the One-Time Programmable Master Key (OTPMK), which is unique per device. To encrypt and sign the images for i.MX 8M devices, follow the steps below.

3.1.4.1 Image layout of bootloader

There are two kinds of boot image structures. Taking `imx8mm_evk_android_trusty_defconfig` as an example, its corresponding output file is `u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx`. The following diagram shows the structure of the output file.




Figure 11. Output file structure 1

Taking `imx8mm_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig` as an example, its corresponding output files are `spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin` and `bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img`. The following diagram shows the structure of the output file.




Figure 12. Output file structure 2

3.1.4.2 Enabling the encrypted boot support in U-Boot

To deploy an encrypted boot image, additional U-Boot tools are needed. Enable the following feature:

- Defconfig

```
CONFIG_IMX_HAB=y
CONFIG_CMD_PRIBLOB=y
CONFIG_CMD_DEKBLOB=y
```

3.1.4.3 Enabling the encrypted boot support in CST

CST version 3.0.0 and later have the encryption feature enabled by default. If using an earlier version, the encryption feature must be explicitly enabled.

For CST versions earlier than 3.0.0, the CST back-end must be recompiled. Execute the following commands to enable encryption support in CST:

```
$ sudo apt-get install libssl-dev openssl
$ cd <CST install directory>/code/back_end/src
$ gcc -o cst_encrypted -I ../hdr -L ../linux64/lib *.c -lfrontend -lcrypto
$ cp cst_encrypted ../linux64/bin/cst
```

3.1.4.4 Building Android images to generate the file to be signed

As explained in `${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/doc/imx/habv4/guides/mx8m_secure_boot.txt`, the `imx-mkimage` project is used to package all images.

Create a dummy DEK blob at `${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/imx-mkimage/imx8M`:

```
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=imx8M/dek_blob_fit_dummy.bin bs=96 count=1 && sync
```

The U-Boot image must be recompiled after these changes are made. The existence of this dummy file enables the build script to add a `dek_blob` node in `u-boot.its`, and then `mkimage_imx8` adds reserved space for `dek_blob` in the target file.

3.1.4.5 Recording the build log to get the layout information

The layout information of the final U-Boot image is needed during the signing and encrypting process. When building the Android images, save the log information of the build system. The `mkimage` log is used during the encrypted boot procedure to create the Command Sequence File (CSF).

- Single-bootloader condition

For the single bootloader condition, take `imx8mm_evk_android_trusty_defconfig` as an example, the lines directly related to the layout information of this output file are listed below, and the unrelated lines are omitted and represented with ellipsis.

```
Loader IMAGE:
  header_image_off      0x0
  dcd_off               0x0
  image_off             0x40
  csf_off               0x33e00
  spl_hab block:        0x7e0fc0 0x0 0x33e00

Second Loader IMAGE:
  sld_header_off        0x57c00
  sld_csf_off           0x58c20
  sld_hab block:        0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x1020
  fit-fdt csf_off       0x5ac20
  fit-fdt hab block:    0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x3020
...

0x40200000 0x5CC00 0x11C918
0x4031C918 0x179518 0xE5E8
0x920000 0x187B00 0xDB30
0xBE000000 0x195630 0x191A00
...
=====Finish building imx8mm-
trusty:imx8mm_evk_android_trusty_defconfig =====
```

- Dual-bootloader condition

For the dual-bootloader condition, take `imx8mm_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig` as an example. The lines directly related to the layout information of this output file are listed below, and the unrelated lines are omitted and represented with ellipsis.

```
Loader IMAGE:
  header_image_off      0x0
  dcd_off               0x0
  image_off             0x40
  csf_off               0x34600
  spl_hab block:        0x7e0fc0 0x0 0x34600

...

FIT IVT IMAGE:
  fit_csf_off           0x1020
  fit_hab block:        0x401fadc0 0x0 0x1020
```

```

fit-fdt_csf_off      0x3020
fit-fdt_hab_block:   0x401fadc0 0x0 0x3020

...

0x40200000 0x5000 0x11CA50
0x4031CA50 0x121A50 0xE5F0
0x920000 0x130040 0xDB30
0xBE000000 0x13DB70 0x191A00
...
=====Finish building imx8mm-trusty-
dual:imx8mm_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig =====

```

3.1.4.6 Creating the CSF description file for SPL + DDR FW image

Copy the files to be signed to the directory of `linux64/bin/` in the Code Signing Tool (CST) directory. The binary file named CST is used to sign these files. This CST needs the CSF description file to be as an input file when it is executed. The CSF description file examples are in the directory of `${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/doc/imx/habv4/csf_examples/mx8m/`. Copy the files listed below to CST `linux64/bin/`:

```

csf_spl_enc.txt
csf_spl_sign_enc.txt
csf_fit_enc.txt
csf_fit_sign_enc.txt
csf_fit_fdt.txt

```

The file to be signed also needs to be copied to this directory. The signing process is different between the single-bootloader condition and dual-bootloader condition. The examples of the two conditions are described in the following sections, but in practice, different U-Boot target files should be signed with the following steps one by one.

The current CST implementation is not possible to encrypt and sign an image at the same time. Therefore, two CSF files are required when HAB is used.

- Single-bootloader condition

For the single-bootloader example with `imx8mm_evk_android_trusty_defconfig` defconfig file, modify `csf_spl_enc.txt` and `csf_spl_sign_enc.txt` just copied.

Modify the first file `csf_spl_enc.txt` as follows to encrypt the SPL and DDR FW images, and generate the `dek_spl.bin` file. The encrypted SPL and DDR FW images are generated as `u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc.imx`.

1. Add the MFG feature to avoid Manufacturing Protection Public Key (MPPUBK, generated from CAAM module) being wiped.

```

[Unlock]
Engine = CAAM
Features = MID, MFG

```

2. Add the Authenticate Data command to only cover SPL IVT and boot data:

```

[Authenticate Data]
...
# Blocks = Authenticate_Start_Address Header_Image_Off SPL_header(fixed
value)
Blocks = 0x7e0fc0 0x0 0x40 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx"

```

Note: All hexadecimal numbers here can be obtained from the build log.

Authenticate_Start_Address is the first hexadecimal number in the *spl hab* block entry:

```
spl hab block:          0x7e0fc0          0x0
0x33e00
          Authenticate_Start_Address  Header_Image_Off
SPL_Image_length
```

3. Add the Install Secret Key command to generate the `dek_spl.bin` file and install the blob. The Blob Address depends on your image layout and can be calculated as follows:

```
[Install Secret Key]
...
Key = "dek_spl.bin"
# Blob Address = Authenticate_Start_Address + SPL_Image_length +
CSF_Padding(fixed value)
#               = 0x7e0fc0 + 0x33e00 + 0x2000 = 0x816dc0
Blob Address = 0x816dc0
```

Note: *CSF_Padding* is a fixed value. This is the space reserved for CSF.

4. Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file. As the SPL image header cannot be encrypted, calculate the Block as follows:
 Start Address = *Authenticate_Start_Address* + *SPL_header* (fixed value) = `0x7e0fc0 + 0x40 = 0x7e1000`
 Offset = *image_off* = `0x40`
 Decrypt size = *SPL_Image_length* - *SPL_header* (fixed value) = `0x33e00 - 0x40 = 0x33dc0`

```
[Decrypt Data]
...
Blocks = 0x7e1000 0x40 0x33dc0 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc.imx"
```

Note: *SPL_header* is a fixed value, which is determined by the size of the SPL header structure.

Modify the second file `csf_spl_sign_enc.txt` as follows. This file is used to sign the encrypted SPL image previously generated (`u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc.imx`).

5. Add the MFG feature to avoid MPPUBK being wiped.

```
[Unlock]
Engine = CAAM
Features = MID, MFG
```

6. The Authenticate Data command should cover the entire SPL and DDR FW image. The file parameter is the encrypted image `u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc.imx`:

```
[Authenticate Data]
...
# Blocks = Authenticate_Start_Address Header_Image_Off SPL_Image_length
Blocks = 0x7e0fc0 0x0 0x33e00 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc.imx"
```

7. Add the Install Secret Key command to generate a dummy DEK blob file. The blob address should be the same as used in `csf_spl_enc.txt`:

```
[Install Secret Key]
...
Key = "dek_spl_dummy.bin"
Blob Address = 0x816dc0
```

8. Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file. As the image was encrypted in CSF above, encrypt a dummy file. The block addresses should be the same as used in `csf_spl_enc.txt`:

```
[Decrypt Data]
...
```

```
Blocks = 0x7e1000 0x40 0x33dc0 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc-dummy.imx"
```

- Dual-bootloader condition

For the dual-bootloader example with the `imx8mm_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig` defconfig file, modify `csf_spl_enc.txt` and `csf_spl_sign_enc.txt` just copied.

Modify the first file `csf_spl_enc.txt` as follows to encrypt the SPL and DDR FW images and generate the `dek_spl.bin` file. The encrypted SPL and DDR FW images are generated as `spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.bin`.

1. Add the MFG feature to avoid MPPUBK being wiped:

```
[Unlock]
Engine = CAAM
Features = MID, MFG
```

2. Add the Authenticate Data command to only cover SPL IVT and boot data:

```
[Authenticate Data]
...
# Blocks = Authenticate_Start_Address header_image_off SPL_header(fixed
value)
Blocks = 0x7e0fc0 0x0 0x40 "spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin"
```

Note: All hexadecimal numbers here can be obtained from the build log.

`Authenticate_Start_Address` is the first hexadecimal number in the `spl hab block` entry:

```
spl hab block:          0x7e0fc0          0x0
0x34600
          Authenticate_Start_Address  header_image_off
SPL_Image_length
```

3. Add the Install Secret Key command to generate the `dek_spl.bin` file and install the blob. The Blob Address depends on the image layout and can be calculated as follows:

```
[Install Secret Key]
...
Key = "dek_spl.bin"
# Blob Address = Authenticate_Start_Address + SPL_Image_length +
CSF_Padding(fixed value)
#           = 0x7e0fc0 + 0x34600 + 0x2000 = 0x8175c0
Blob Address = 0x8175c0
```

4. Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file. As the SPL image header cannot be encrypted, calculate the Block as follows:

Start Address = `Authenticate_Start_Address` + `SPL_header` (fixed value) = `0x7e0fc0` + `0x40` = `0x7e1000`

Offset = `image_off` = `0x40`

Decrypt size = `SPL_Image_length` - `SPL_header` (fixed value) = `0x34600` - `0x40` = `0x345c0`

```
[Decrypt Data]
...
Blocks = 0x7e1000 0x40 0x345c0 "spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.bin"
```

Modify the second file `csf_spl_sign_enc.txt` as follows to sign the encrypted SPL image previously generated (`spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.bin`).

5. Add the MFG feature to avoid MPPUBK being wiped:

```
[Unlock]
Engine = CAAM
Features = MID, MFG
```

6. The Authenticate Data command should cover the entire SPL and DDR FW image. The file parameter is the encrypted image `spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.bin`:

```
[Authenticate Data]
...
# Blocks = Authenticate_Start_Address header_image_off SPL_Image_length
Blocks = 0x7e0fc0 0x0 0x34600 "spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.bin"
```

7. Add the Install Secret Key command to generate a dummy DEK blob file. The blob address should be the same as used in `csf_spl_enc.txt`:

```
[Install Secret Key]
...
Key = "dek_spl_dummy.bin"
Blob Address = 0x8175c0
```

8. Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file. As the image was encrypted in CSF above, encrypt a dummy file. The block addresses should be the same as used in `csf_spl_enc.txt`:

```
[Decrypt Data]
...
Blocks = 0x7e1000 0x40 0x345c0 "spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc-dummy.bin"
```

3.1.4.7 Encrypting and signing the SPL + DDR FW image

The CST is used to encrypt the image and regenerate a random DEK. During this procedure, two CSF binaries are generated, but only one is included in the final image.

- Single-bootloader condition

For the single-bootloader condition, execute the following commands to generate CSF with the CSF description files.

- Encrypt the SPL + DDR FW image:

```
$ cp u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc.imx
$ ./cst -i csf_spl_enc.txt -o csf_spl_enc.bin
```

- Sign the encrypted SPL + DDR FW image:

```
$ cp u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc.imx u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc-dummy.imx
$ ./cst -i csf_spl_sign_enc.txt -o csf_spl_sign_enc.bin
```

- Dual-bootloader condition

For the dual-bootloader condition, execute the following commands to generate CSF with the CSF description files.

- Encrypt the SPL + DDR FW image:

```
$ cp spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.bin
$ ./cst -i csf_spl_enc.txt -o csf_spl_enc.bin
```

- Sign the encrypted SPL + DDR FW image:

```
$ cp spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.bin spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc-dummy.bin
$ ./cst -i csf_spl_sign_enc.txt -o csf_spl_sign_enc.bin
```

3.1.4.8 Creating the final CSF binary for SPL image

As only one CSF binary is included in the final image, it is necessary to swap Nonce/MAC from `csf_spl_enc.bin` to `csf_spl_sign_enc.bin`. The following steps are the same for single-bootloader condition and dual-bootloader condition.

1. Calculate Nonce/MAC size based on the MAC bytes value in CSF:

```
Nonce/MAC size = Nonce size + MAC bytes + CSF header for Nonce/Mac = 12 + 16
+ 8 = 36 bytes
```

2. Calculate Nonce/MAC offset in CSF:

```
MAC offset = csf_spl_enc.bin size - Nonce/MAC size = 3980 - 36 = 3944 Bytes
```

3. Extract Nonce/MAC from csf_spl_enc.bin:

```
$ dd if=csf_spl_enc.bin of=noncemac.bin bs=1 skip=3944 count=36
```

4. Replace the MAC address of csf_spl_sign_enc.bin with the one extracted above:

```
$ dd if=noncemac.bin of=csf_spl_sign_enc.bin bs=1 seek=3944 count=36
```

3.1.4.9 Creating the CSF description file for FIT image

- Single-bootloader condition

Similar to SPL image, two CSF files are required to encrypt and sign the FIT image. For the single-bootloader condition, the following steps use the `u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc.imx` image created in the steps above. Modify `csf_fit_enc.txt` and `csf_fit_sign_enc.txt` just copied.

Modify the first file `csf_fit_enc.txt` as follows to encrypt the FIT image and generate the `dek_fit.bin` file.

1. Modify the Authenticate Data command to only cover FIT image FDT header:

```
[Authenticate Data]
...
# Blocks = Authenticate_Start_Address sld_header_off sld_csf_off -
sld_header_off
Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x1020 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc.imx"
```

Note: All hexadecimal numbers here can be obtained from the build log.

Authenticate_Start_Address is the first hexadecimal number in the *sld hab block* entry:

```
sld hab block:          0x401fadc0          0x57c00
0x1020
                Authenticate_Start_Address  sld_header_off
sld_csf_off - sld_header_off
```

2. Add the Install Secret Key command to generate the `dek_fit.bin` file and install the blob. The Blob Address is a fixed address defined in `imx-mkimage` project in the `IMX8M/soc.mak` file:

```
DEK_BLOB_LOAD_ADDR = 0x40400000
```

3. Modify the Blob Address:

```
[Install Secret Key]
...
Key = "dek_fit.bin"
Blob Address = 0x40400000
```

4. Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file.

The CST can only encrypt images that are 16 bytes aligned. As `u-boot-nodtb.bin` and `u-boot.dtb` are together 16 bytes aligned, we should consider the first two lines provided in `print_fit_hab` as a single block.

`imx-mkimage` output:

```
0x40200000 0x5CC00 0x11C918-----+-----Total length = 0x11c918 + 0xe5e8 =
0x12af00
0x4031C918 0x179518 0xE5E8-----+
```

```
0x920000 0x187B00 0xDB30
0xBE000000 0x195630 0x191A00
```

Decrypt data in `csf_fit_enc.txt`:

```
[Decrypt Data]
...
Blocks = 0x40200000 0x5cc00 0x12af00 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc.imx",
\
    0x920000 0x187b00 0xdb30 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc.imx", \
    0xbe000000 0x195630 0x191a00 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc.imx"
```

Modify the second file `csf_fit_sign_enc.txt` as follows to sign the encrypted FIT image previously generated (`u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc.imx`).

- The Authenticate Data command should cover the entire FIT image:

```
[Authenticate Data]
...
Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x57c00 0x1020 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc.imx" \
    0x40200000 0x5cc00 0x12af00 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc.imx",
\
    0x920000 0x187b00 0xdb30 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc.imx", \
    0xbe000000 0x195630 0x191a00 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc.imx"
```

- Add the Install Secret Key command to generate a dummy DEK blob file. The blob address should be the same as used in `csf_fit_enc.txt`:

```
[Install Secret Key]
...
Key = "dek_fit_dummy.bin"
Blob Address = 0x40400000
```

- Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file. As the image was encrypted in CSF above, encrypt a dummy file. The block address should be the same as used in `csf_fit_enc.txt`:

```
[Decrypt Data]
...
Blocks = 0x40200000 0x5cc00 0x12af00 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc-
dummy.imx", \
    0x920000 0x187b00 0xdb30 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc-
dummy.imx", \
    0xbe000000 0x195630 0x191a00 "u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc-
dummy.imx"
```

- Dual-bootloader condition

For the dual-bootloader condition, the CSF file is generated based on `bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img`. Modify `csf_fit_enc.txt` and `csf_fit_sign_enc.txt` just copied.

Modify the first file `csf_fit_enc.txt` as follows to encrypt the FIT image and generate the `dek_fit.bin` file.

- Modify the Authenticate Data command to only cover FIT image FDT header:

```
[Authenticate Data]
...
# Blocks = Authenticate_Start_Address fit_header_off fit_csf_off -
fit_header_off
Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x0 0x1020 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img"
```

Note: All hexadecimal numbers here can be obtained from the build log.

`Authenticate_Start_Address` is the first hexadecimal number in the `spl` hab block entry:

```
fit hab block:          0x401fadc0          0x0
0x1020
```

```

Authenticate_Start_Address    fit_header_off
fit_csf_off - fit_header_off

```

2. Add the Install Secret Key command to generate the `dek_fit.bin` file and install the blob. The Blob Address is a fixed address defined in the `imx-mkimage` project in the `iMX8M/soc.mak` file:

```
DEK_BLOB_LOAD_ADDR = 0x40400000
```

3. Modify the Blob Address:

```

[Install Secret Key]
...
Key = "dek_fit.bin"
Blob Address = 0x40400000

```

The CST can only encrypt images that are 16 bytes aligned. As `u-boot-nodtb.bin` and `u-boot.dtb` are together 16 bytes aligned, we should consider the first two lines provided in `print_fit_hab` as a single block.

`imx-mkimage` output:

```

0x40200000 0x5000 0x11ca50----+----Total length = 0x11ca50 + 0xe5f0 =
0x12b040
0x4031ca50 0x121a50 0xe5f0----+
0x920000 0x130040 0xdb30
0xbe000000 0x13db70 0x191a00

```

4. Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file.

```

[Decrypt Data]
...
Blocks = 0x40200000 0x5000 0x12b040 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-
enc.img", \
        0x920000 0x130040 0xdb30 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-
enc.img", \
        0xbe000000 0x13db70 0x191a00 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-
enc.img"

```

Modify the second file `csf_fit_sign_enc.txt` as follows to sign the encrypted FIT image previously generated (`bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.img`).

5. The Authenticate Data command should cover the entire FIT image:

```

[Authenticate Data]
...
Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x0 0x1020 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.img"
\
        0x40200000 0x5000 0x12b040 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-
enc.img", \
        0x920000 0x130040 0xdb30 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-
enc.img", \
        0xbe000000 0x13db70 0x191a00 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-
enc.img"

```

6. Add the Install Secret Key command to generate a dummy DEK blob file, the blob address should be the same as used in `csf_fit_enc.txt`:

```

[Install Secret Key]
...
Key = "dek_fit_dummy.bin"
Blob Address = 0x40400000

```

7. Add the Decrypt Data command to encrypt the file. As image was encrypted in CSF above, encrypt a dummy file. The block address should be the same as used in `csf_fit_enc.txt`:

```
[Decrypt Data]
...
Blocks = 0x40200000 0x5000 0x12b040 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc-
dummy.img", \
        0x920000 0x130040 0xdb30 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc-
dummy.img", \
        0xbe000000 0x13db70 0x191a00 "bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc-
dummy.img"
```

3.1.4.10 Encrypting and signing the FIT image

The CST is used to encrypt the image and regenerate a random DEK. During this procedure, two CSF binaries are generated, but only one is included in the final image.

- Single-bootloader condition

For the single-bootloader condition, execute the following commands to encrypt and sign the image. The CSF description files are generated at the same time.

1. Encrypt the FIT image:

```
$ cp u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-spl-enc.imx u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc.imx
$ ./cst -i csf_fit_enc.txt -o csf_fit_enc.bin
```

2. Sign the encrypted FIT image:

```
$ cp u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc.imx u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc-dummy.imx
$ ./cst -i csf_fit_sign_enc.txt -o csf_fit_sign_enc.bin
```

- Dual-bootloader condition

For the dual-bootloader condition, execute the following commands.

1. Encrypt the FIT image:

```
$ cp bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.img
$ ./cst -i csf_fit_enc.txt -o csf_fit_enc.bin
```

2. Sign the encrypted FIT image:

```
$ cp bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.img bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-
enc-dummy.img
$ ./cst -i csf_fit_sign_enc.txt -o csf_fit_sign_enc.bin
```

3.1.4.11 Creating the final CSF binary for FIT image

As only one CSF binary is included in the final image, it is necessary to swap Nonce/MAC from `csf_fit_enc.bin` to `csf_fit_sign_enc.bin`. The following steps are the same for single-bootloader condition and dual-bootloader condition.

1. Calculate the Nonce/MAC size based on the MAC bytes value in CSF:

```
Nonce/MAC size = Nonce size + MAC bytes + CSF header for Nonce/Mac = 12 + 16
+ 8 = 36 bytes
```

2. Calculate the Nonce/MAC offset in `csf_fit_enc.bin`:

```
MAC offset = csf_fit_enc.bin size - Nonce/MAC size = 3996 - 36 = 3960 Bytes
```

3. Extract Nonce/MAC from `csf_fit_enc.bin`:

```
$ dd if=csf_fit_enc.bin of=noncemac.bin bs=1 skip=3960 count=36
```

4. Calculate the Nonce/MAC offset in `csf_fit_sign_enc.bin`:

```
MAC offset = csf_fit_enc.bin size - Nonce/MAC size = 4020 - 36 = 3984 Bytes
```

5. Replace the MAC of `csf_fit_sign_enc.bin` with the one extracted above:

```
$ dd if=noncemac.bin of=csf_fit_sign_enc.bin bs=1 seek=3984 count=36
```

3.1.4.12 Generating the DEK Blob

The DEK must be encapsulated into a CAAM blob, so it can be included into the final encrypted binary. The U-Boot provides fastboot commands called `generate-dek-blob`, which calls the CAAM implementation included in the Trusty OS. This command is only functional on a board with a closed configuration and signed images. See [Section 3.1.2](#) to generate secure boot images and correctly closed the board. The following step is the same for single-bootloader condition and dual-bootloader condition.

Boot the board and enter fastboot mode. Execute the following commands from host PC:

```
$ fastboot stage dek_spl.bin
$ fastboot oem generate-dek-blob
$ fastboot get_staged dek_spl_blob.bin
$ fastboot stage dek_fit.bin
$ fastboot oem generate-dek-blob
$ fastboot get_staged dek_fit_blob.bin
```

The host PC then generates `dek_spl_blob.bin` and `dek_fit_blob.bin`.

3.1.4.13 Inserting CSF files and DEK blob

• Single-bootloader condition

1. For the single-bootloader condition, execute the following commands from the host PC:

```
$ cp u-boot-imx8mm-trusty-fit-enc.imx encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx
```

2. `imx-mkimage` has reserved space for the CSF binary at target files. Check the build log. The offset of the CSF binary for SPL is printed after the `csf_off` label. Insert `csf_spl_sign_enc.bin` in `encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx` at the `0x33e00` offset:

```
$ dd if=csf_spl_sign_enc.bin of=encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx seek=
$((0x33e00)) bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

3. The size of CSF reserved space is `0x2000` bytes. `dek_blob` should be added next to it. Insert `dek_spl_blob.bin` in `encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx` at the `0x33e00 + 0x2000` offset:

```
$ dd if=dek_spl_blob.bin of=encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx seek=
$((0x35e00)) bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

4. The offset of the CSF binary for FIT is printed after the `sld_csf_off` label. Insert `csf_fit_sign_enc.bin` in `encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx` at the `0x58c20` offset:

```
$ dd if=csf_fit_sign_enc.bin of=encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx seek=
$((0x58c20)) bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

5. The DEK blob must be inserted in the last image entry on FIT image. The last line provided by the `print_fit_hab` target log can be used:

```
0x40200000 0x5CC00 0x11C918
```

```
0x4031C918 0x179518 0xE5E8
0x920000 0x187B00 0xDB30
0xBE000000 0x195630 0x191A00 -> Last line in print_fit_hab log
```

6. Insert `dek_fit_blob.bin` in `encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx` at the `0x195630 + 0x191a00` offset:

```
$ dd if=dek_fit_blob.bin of=encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx seek=
$((0x327030)) bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

- Dual-bootloader condition

1. For the dual-bootloader condition, execute the following commands from the host PC:

```
$ cp spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.bin encrypted-spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin
$ cp bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual-enc.img encrypted-bootloader-imx8mm-
trusty-dual.img
```

2. Similar to the single-bootloader condition, the offset of the CSF binary for SPL is printed after the `csf_off` label. Insert `csf_spl_sign_enc.bin` in `encrypted-spl.bin` at the `0x35200` offset:

```
$ dd if=csf_spl_sign_enc.bin of=encrypted-spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin seek=
$((0x34600)) bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

3. The size of the CSF reserved space is `0x2000` bytes. `dek_blob` should be added next to it. Insert `dek_spl_blob.bin` in `encrypted-spl.bin` at the `0x35200 + 0x2000` offset:

```
$ dd if=dek_spl_blob.bin of=encrypted-spl-imx8mm-trusty-dual.bin seek=
$((0x36600)) bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

4. The difference from the single-bootloader condition is that, the offset of the CSF binary for FIT is printed after the `fit_csf_off` label. Insert `csf_fit_sign_enc.bin` in `encrypted-fit.bin` at the `0x1020` offset:

```
$ dd if=csf_fit_sign_enc.bin of=encrypted-bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img
seek=$((0x1020)) bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

5. The DEK blob must be inserted in the last image entry on the FIT image. The last line provided by the `print_fit_hab` target log can be used:

```
0x40200000 0x5000 0x11CA50
0x4031CA50 0x121A50 0xE5F0
0x920000 0x130040 0xDB30
0xBE000000 0x13DB70 0x191A00 -> Last line in print_fit_hab log
```

6. Insert `dek_fit_blob.bin` in `encrypted-fit.bin` at the `0x13db70 + 0x191a00` offset:

```
$ dd if=dek_fit_blob.bin of=encrypted-bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img
seek=$((0x2cf570)) bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

3.1.4.14 Signing the FIT header

Modify the third file `csf_fit_fdt.txt` as follows to sign the FIT header (FDT-FIT, IVT-FIT, CSF-FIT, and IVT-FIT FDT).

- Single-bootloader condition:

```
[Authenticate Data]
...
# Blocks = Authenticate Start Address, sld_header_off, fit-fdt_csf_off -
sld_header_off
Blocks = 0x401fad0 0x57c00 0x3020 "encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.imx"
```

- Dual-bootloader condition:

```
[Authenticate Data]
...
# Blocks = Authenticate Start Address, fit_header_off, fit-fdt_csf_off -
fit_header_off
Blocks = 0x401fadc0 0x0 0x3020 "encrypted-bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-
dual.img"
```

Then use the following command to sign the FIT header and generate the CSF. This step is same for the single-bootloader condition and dual-bootloader condition.

```
$ ./cst -i csf_fit_fdt.txt -o csf_fit_fdt.bin
```

Finally, insert the CSF file to the encrypted FIT image by the following command.

- Single-bootloader condition:

The offset of the CSF binary for the FIT header is printed after the `fit-fdt csf_off` label. Insert `csf_fit_fdt.bin` to `encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.img` at the `0x5ac20` offset:

```
$ dd if=csf_fit_fdt.bin of=encrypted-u-boot-imx8mm-trusty.img seek=$((0x5ac20))
bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

- Dual-bootloader condition:

The offset of the CSF binary for the FIT header is printed after the `fit-fdt csf_off` label. Insert `csf_fit_fdt.bin` to `encrypted-bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img` at the `0x3020` offset:

```
$ dd if=csf_fit_fdt.bin of=encrypted-bootloader-imx8mm-trusty-dual.img seek=
$((0x3020)) bs=1 conv=notrunc
```

3.1.4.15 Flashing the encrypted boot image

With preceding command successfully executed, signed and encrypted images are generated. Copy them back to the output directory, change their names as before, and flash them to the corresponding partition. If everything is done correctly, the board boots successfully.

3.2 Configurations on TEE

3.2.1 Memory region configuration in ATF

The TEE binary is loaded to DRAM at the address of `$BL32_BASE` by SPL. By default, the load address `$BL32_BASE` is defined as `0xFE000000`. It is specified during the process of generating the bootloader image with `imx-mkimage`. For example, you can specify the load address as `0xFF000000` for i.MX 8QuadMax and i.MX 8QuadXPlus in `$(MY_ANDROID)/vendor/nxp-opensource/imx-mkimage` as follows:

```
diff --git a/imx8QM/soc.mak b/imx8QM/soc.mak
index 355851e..fe70191 100644
--- a/imx8QM/soc.mak
+++ b/imx8QM/soc.mak
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ u-boot-atf-container.img: bl31.bin u-boot-hash.bin
 fi
 if [ -f "tee.bin" ]; then \
     if [ $(shell echo $(ROLLBACK_INDEX_IN_CONTAINER)) ]; then \
         - ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -sw_version $(ROLLBACK_INDEX_IN_CONTAINER) -rev B0 -
c -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -ap u-boot-hash.bin a53 0x80020000 -ap tee.bin a53
0xFE000000 -out u-boot-atf-container.img; \
```

```

+ ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -sw_version $(ROLLBACK_INDEX_IN_CONTAINER) -rev B0 -
c -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -ap u-boot-hash.bin a53 0x80020000 -ap tee.bin a53
0xFF000000 -out u-boot-atf-container.img; \
else \
./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -c -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -ap u-
boot-hash.bin a53 0x80020000 -ap tee.bin a53 0xFE000000 -out u-boot-atf-
container.img; \
fi; \
diff --git a/iMX8QX/soc.mak b/iMX8QX/soc.mak
index 56422e0..d917dc3 100644
--- a/iMX8QX/soc.mak
+++ b/iMX8QX/soc.mak
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ u-boot-atf.itb: u-boot-hash.bin bl31.bin
u-boot-atf-container.img: bl31.bin u-boot-hash.bin
if [ -f tee.bin ]; then \
    if [ $(shell echo $(ROLLBACK_INDEX_IN_CONTAINER)) ]; then \
        - ./$(MKIMG) -soc QX -sw_version $(ROLLBACK_INDEX_IN_CONTAINER) -rev B0 -
c -ap bl31.bin a35 0x80000000 -ap u-boot-hash.bin a35 0x80020000 -ap tee.bin a35
0xFE000000 -out u-boot-atf-container.img; \
        + ./$(MKIMG) -soc QX -sw_version $(ROLLBACK_INDEX_IN_CONTAINER) -rev B0 -
c -ap bl31.bin a35 0x80000000 -ap u-boot-hash.bin a35 0x80020000 -ap tee.bin a35
0xFF000000 -out u-boot-atf-container.img; \
    else \
        ./$(MKIMG) -soc QX -rev B0 -c -ap bl31.bin a35 0x80000000 -ap u-
boot-hash.bin a35 0x80020000 -ap tee.bin a35 0xFE000000 -out u-boot-atf-
container.img; \
    fi; \

```

After loading the TEE binary to DRAM, the ATF tries to kick it at the address of `$BL32_BASE` with the size of `$BL32_SIZE`, which are defined in `{MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/arm-trusted-firmware/plat/imx/{PLAT}/include/platform_def.h`. By default, `$BL32_BASE` is defined as `0xFE000000` and `$BL32_SIZE` is `0x02000000`, but you can configure them as needed. For example, `$BL32_BASE` can be configured as `0xFF000000` and `$BASE_SIZE` can be configured as `0x03000000` for i.MX 8QuadMax and i.MX 8QuadXPlus as follows:

```

diff --git a/plat/imx/imx8qm/include/platform_def.h b/plat/imx/imx8qm/include/
platform_def.h
index b305bfc..6f9f7d4 100644
--- a/plat/imx/imx8qm/include/platform_def.h
+++ b/plat/imx/imx8qm/include/platform_def.h
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@
#define BL31_LIMIT 0x80020000
#ifdef TEE_IMX8
-#define BL32_BASE 0xfe000000
-#define BL32_SIZE 0x02000000
+#define BL32_BASE 0xff000000
+#define BL32_SIZE 0x03000000
#define BL32_SHM_SIZE 0x00400000
#define BL32_LIMIT 0x100000000
#endif
diff --git a/plat/imx/imx8qxp/include/platform_def.h b/plat/imx/imx8qxp/include/
platform_def.h
index 24eacc2..cfc0717 100644
--- a/plat/imx/imx8qxp/include/platform_def.h
+++ b/plat/imx/imx8qxp/include/platform_def.h
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
#define BL31_LIMIT 0x80020000
#ifdef TEE_IMX8
-#define BL32_BASE 0xfe000000

```

```

-#define BL32_SIZE 0x02000000
+#define BL32_BASE 0xff000000
+#define BL32_SIZE 0x03000000
#define BL32_SHM_SIZE 0x00400000
#define BL32_LIMIT 0x100000000
#define PLAT_TEE_IMAGE_OFFSET 0x84000000

```

The following table lists the recommended \$BL32_BASE and \$BL32_SIZE for DRAM with different sizes on the i.MX 8Quad platform:

Table 3. Recommended \$BL32_BASE and \$BL32_SIZE for DRAM

DRAM Size (GB)	\$BL32_BASE	\$BL32_SIZE
6	0xFE000000	0x02000000
4	0xFE000000	0x02000000
3	0xFE000000	0x02000000
2	0xFE000000	0x02000000
1	0xBE000000	0x02000000

3.2.2 Basic file and folder construction for Trusty OS

i.MX Trusty OS provides a security solution for Android platform and Android Automotive platform. It also provides a set of development APIs for customer to develop their own TAs.

Trusty OS is based on LittleKernel. i.MX Trusty OS has the following basic file structure.

Table 4. Basic file structure of i.MX Trusty OS

Folder name	Folder description
trusty/device/nxp/imx8	This folder contains the script files. Most of the configurations for the build target are defined in this folder, including project configuration files. The Makefile configurations, board configurations, and modules need to be built.
trusty/hardware/nxp/app	NXP-specific TA source code folder. Currently the hwcrypto TA located in this folder that provides security functions depends on the i.MX SoC hardware.
trusty/hardware/nxp/target	NXP reference board target folder. Only rules.mk for the build target in this folder, platform name, and UART information are defined in this file.
trusty/hardware/nxp/platform/imx	NXP SoC specific source codes for Trusty OS. All i.MX SoCs share these codes. It includes platform initialization codes, UART drivers, and registers map definitions.
trusty/kernel/lib	Trusty OS core codes including secure monitor calls management, TIPC/QL-TIPC stack.
external/trusty/lk	LittleKernel codes, including all LittleKernel modules like arch codes, interrupt management, task management, and SMP support.
trusty/user/app	Trusty OS TAs are placed here, including AVB, Gatekeeper, and Keymaster user space source codes.

For TAs implementation, see Google Trusty OS reference webpage: <https://source.android.com/security/trusty/trusty-ref>.

3.2.3 Applying new build target in Trusty OS

By default, NXP already provides i.MX 8QuadMax/8QuadXPlus and i.MX 8M Mini/8M Quad series template in the i.MX Trusty OS. To add a new platform based on i.MX 8QuadMax/8QuadXPlus or i.MX 8M Mini/8M Quad/8M Plus, add or modify the following file or modules.

In `${MY_TRUSTY}/trusty/device/nxp/imx8/project`, `imx8-inc.mk` contains all common configurations, such as CPU cores, modules that need to be built. The `imx8-inc.mk` can be overwritten by the build target mk files, such as `imx8qm.mk`.

For example, to add a new build target based on i.MX 8QuadMax SoC called `imx8qm-abc`, which has six CPUs and 1024 RPMB blocks, write a new `.mk` file called `imx8qm-abc.mk` in `${MY_TRUSTY}/trusty/device/nxp/imx8/project`. The content is as follows:

```
TARGET := imx8q
# imx8q/x use lpuart for UART IP
IMX_USE_LPUART := true
SMP_MAX_CPUS := 6
STORAGE_RPMB_BLOCK_COUNT := 1024
include project/imx8-inc.mk
```

In the root of Trusty OS codes, execute `$make list`. Then `imx8qm-abc` is displayed.

3.2.4 Adding unit tests in Trusty OS and adding CAAM self-tests in Trusty OS

Trusty OS supports two unit tests to test the functionality of Trusty IPC (TIPC) and CAAM. It is only for debugging purposes and should not be released with the open unit tests. For i.MX 8QuadMax and i.MX 8QuadXPlus, to include these unit tests, make the following changes in `${MY_TRUSTY}/trusty/device/nxp/imx8/project`:

```
diff --git a/project/imx8-inc.mk b/project/imx8-inc.mk
index 681a223..e7dcfdb 100644
--- a/project/imx8-inc.mk
+++ b/project/imx8-inc.mk
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ GLOBAL_DEFINES += APP_STORAGE_RPMB_BLOCK_COUNT=$(STORAGE_RPMB_BLOCK_COUNT)
GLOBAL_DEFINES += \
WITH_LIB_VERSION=1 \
+ WITH_CAAM_SELF_TEST=1 \
# ARM suggest to use system registers to access GICv3/v4 registers
GLOBAL_DEFINES += ARM_GIC_USE_SYSTEM_REG=1
@@ -98,6 +99,8 @@ TRUSTY_ALL_USER_TASKS := \
trusty/user/app/keymaster \
trusty/user/app/gatekeeper \
trusty/user/app/storage \
+ trusty/user/base/lib/tipc/test/main \
+ trusty/user/base/lib/tipc/test/srv \
# This project requires trusty IPC
WITH_TRUSTY_IPC := true
```

Rebuild the Trusty OS and copy the output binary to `${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp/fsl-proprietary/uboot-firmware/imx8q_car`. Make the following changes to build out the `trusty-ut-ctrl` binary:

```
diff --git a/imx8q/mek_8q/mek_8q.mk b/imx8q/mek_8q/mek_8q.mk
index f34f38e1..ea64ed94 100644
--- a/imx8q/mek_8q/mek_8q.mk
+++ b/imx8q/mek_8q/mek_8q.mk
@@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ PRODUCT_PACKAGES += \
    android.hardware.gatekeeper-service.trusty \
    storageproxyd \
    imx_dek_extractor \
- imx_dek_inserter
+ imx_dek_inserter \
+ trusty-ut-ctrl
endif
```

```
ifeq ($(PRODUCT_IMX_TRUSTY),true)
```

Rebuild the Android project, the `trusty-ut-ctrl` binary is located at `${MY_ANDROID}/out/target/product/mek_8q/vendor/bin/trusty-ut-ctrl`.

Flash the images to board, Trusty OS runs the CAAM unit test when initializing the CAAM, The following logs are displayed in U-Boot if the CAAM is initialized correctly:

```
hwsecure: 22: hwsecure init.
caam_drv: 2425: caam hwrng test PASS!!!
caam_drv: 2458: caam blob test PASS!!!
caam_drv: 969: dek blob decap succeed!
caam_drv: 2482: caam dek blob test PASS!!!
caam_drv: 2565: caam gen kdf root key test PASS!!!
caam_drv: 2515: caam AES enc test PASS!!!
caam_drv: 2524: caam AES enc test PASS!!!
caam_drv: 2552: caam hash test PASS!!!
caam_drv: 2645: AES CBC encryption test passed!
caam_drv: 2653: AES CBC decryption test passed!
caam_drv: 2596: AES ECB encryption test passed!
caam_drv: 2604: AES ECB decryption test passed!
caam_drv: 2703: AES CTR encryption test passed!
caam_drv: 2711: AES CTR decryption test passed!
caam_drv: 2775: AES GCM encryption test passed!
caam_drv: 2784: AES GCM decryption test passed!
caam_drv: 2820: DES EDE ECB encryption test passed!
caam_drv: 2828: DES EDE ECB decryption test passed!
caam_drv: 2899: DES EDE CBC encryption test passed!
caam_drv: 2907: DES EDE CBC decryption test passed!
```

Run the following command to test the Trusty Inter Process Communication (IPC):

```
mek_8q:/ # trusty-ut-ctrl com.android.ipc-unittest.ctrl
```

The correct results are:

```
ipc-unittest-main: 2778: first_free_handle_index: 3
ipc-unittest-main: 2762: retry ret 0, event handle 1000, event 0x1
ipc-unittest-main: 2765: nested ret -13, event handle 1000, event 0x1
[ RUN      ] ipc.wait_negative
[ OK      ] ipc.wait_negative
[ RUN      ] ipc.close_handle_negative
[ OK      ] ipc.close_handle_negative
[ RUN      ] ipc.set_cookie_negative
[ OK      ] ipc.set_cookie_negative
...
[ RUN      ] ipc.recv_handle
[ OK      ] ipc.recv_handle
[ RUN      ] ipc.recv_handle_negative
[ OK      ] ipc.recv_handle_negative
[ RUN      ] ipc.send_handle_bulk
[ OK      ] ipc.send_handle_bulk
[ RUN      ] ipc.echo_handle_bulk
[ OK      ] ipc.echo_handle_bulk
[ RUN      ] ipc.tipc_connect
[ OK      ] ipc.tipc_connect
[ RUN      ] ipc.tipc_send_recv_1
[ OK      ] ipc.tipc_send_recv_1
[ RUN      ] ipc.tipc_send_recv_hdr_payload
[ OK      ] ipc.tipc_send_recv_hdr_payload
[ RUN      ] ipc.dup_is_different
[ OK      ] ipc.dup_is_different
[=====] 42 tests ran.
[ PASSED  ] 42 tests.
[ DISABLED ] 2 tests.
```

3.2.5 Modifying the console port for Trusty OS

Due to different hardware board designs, the debug UART may be different. i.MX Trusty OS supports to configure a different UART port by modifying the source code.

The debug UART address is defined in `trusty/hardware/nxp/platform/imx/soc/$SOC_NAME/include/imx-regs.h`.

For example, if LPUART1 is used instead of LPUART0 for i.MX 8QuadMax board, make the following modifications on `imx-regs.h`:

```
diff --git a/platform/imx/soc/imx8q/include/imx-regs.h b/platform/imx/soc/imx8q/
include/imx-regs.h
index 3cbcce2..0235e69 100644
--- a/platform/imx/soc/imx8q/include/imx-regs.h
+++ b/platform/imx/soc/imx8q/include/imx-regs.h
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
     #define CONFIG_LPUART3_BASE 0x5A090000
     #define CONFIG_LPUART4_BASE 0x5A0A0000

-#define CONFIG_CONSOLE_TTY_BASE CONFIG_LPUART0_BASE
+#define CONFIG_CONSOLE_TTY_BASE CONFIG_LPUART1_BASE

     #define CONFIG_CONSOLE_TTY_VIRT (0xFFFFFFFF00000000 +
CONFIG_CONSOLE_TTY_BASE)
```

3.2.6 Configuring the related TA services

The Trusted Application (TA) is the software running in a secure context. There are several TAs running in the Trusty OS. The following figure shows their relationships.




Figure 13. Relationship between TAs

- AVB TA: It provides tamper proof operations for data used during Android Verified Boot (AVB), such as rollback index, lock/unlock state, and vbmeta public key.
- Storage TA: It provides encrypted and tamper proof storage to secure applications, such as AVB TA. All operations that modify the secure storage are transactional.
- Hardware Crypto TA: It provides hardware crypto and accelerates operations based on CAAM, such as RNG generation and SHA1/SHA256 hash calculation.
- Keymaster TA: It provides all secure Keystore operations, with access to the raw key material, validating all of the access control conditions on keys.

- Gatekeeper TA: It authenticates user passwords and generates authentication tokens used to prove to the Keymaster TA that an authentication is done for a particular user at a particular point in time.

3.2.7 Specifying apploader encryption and sign keys

Trusted Applications (TAs) in Trusty OS can either be built into the Trusty binary or be built as loadable modules. In the case of building the TAs as loadable modules, the build system would encrypt and sign the modules to ensure its integrity and validity.

1. Specify apploader encryption keys.

The Trusty OS build system would encrypt the loadable modules (in AES-GCM mode) if the encryption key file is specified. The encryption keys can be any valid customized keys. An example of the encryption key is in: `${MY_TRUSTY}/trusty/device/nxp/imx8/project/keys/aeskey.bin`.

It is generated by:

```
openssl rand 16 -out aeskey.bin
```

Note: This example encryption key must be replaced by customized key before shipping the products.

In additional, two kinds of encryption keys are supported for different purpose. After generating the encryption key, specify the encryption key files in `${MY_TRUSTY}/trusty/device/nxp/imx8/project/imx8-inc.mk` as follows:

```
APPLoader_ENCRYPT_KEY_0_FILE := <path-to-encryption-key-0>
APPLoader_ENCRYPT_KEY_1_FILE := <path-to-encryption-key-1>
```

To encrypt an application, set the appropriate variable in the application's `rules.mk` as follows:

```
# choose encryption key 0
APPLoader_ENCRYPT_KEY_ID_FOR_${MODULE} := 0
```

or

```
# choose encryption key 1
APPLoader_ENCRYPT_KEY_ID_FOR_${MODULE} := 1
```

2. Specify apploader sign keys.

The Trusty OS build system would sign and generate ECDSA signatures for the loadable modules. An example of the ECDSA sign key pairs are in: `${MY_TRUSTY}/trusty/device/nxp/imx8/project/keys`. They are generated by the script in `{MY_TRUSTY}/trusty/user/base/app/apploader/generate_ecdsa_keys.sh`:

```
./generate_ecdsa_keys.sh <private key file> <public key file>
```

Note: These example sign keys MUST be replaced by customized keys before shipping the products.

Similar to encryption keys, two pairs of sign key files can be provided for different purpose. After generating the sign key pairs, specify the key files in `${MY_TRUSTY}/trusty/device/nxp/imx8/project/imx8-inc.mk` as follows:

```
134 PROJECT_KEYS_DIR := trusty/device/nxp/imx8/project/keys
135
136 APPLoader_SIGN_PRIVATE_KEY_0_FILE := \
137     ${PROJECT_KEYS_DIR}/privateKey0.der
138
139 APPLoader_SIGN_PUBLIC_KEY_0_FILE := \
140     ${PROJECT_KEYS_DIR}/publicKey0.der
141
142 APPLoader_SIGN_PRIVATE_KEY_1_FILE := \
143     ${PROJECT_KEYS_DIR}/privateKey1.der
144
145 APPLoader_SIGN_PUBLIC_KEY_1_FILE := \
146     ${PROJECT_KEYS_DIR}/publicKey1.der
```

```
147
150
151 APPLOADER_SIGN_KEY_ID ?= 0
```

If the apploader sign key is not explicitly specified, Trusty OS would sign the loadable modules with `APPLOADER_SIGN_PRIVATE_KEY_0_FILE` (as 'APPLOADER_SIGN_KEY_ID' is 0). To sign an application with different key, set the appropriate variable in the application's `rules.mk` as follows:

```
# sign with key 0
APPLOADER_SIGN_KEY_ID_FOR_$ (MODULE) := 0
```

or

```
# sign with key 1
APPLOADER_SIGN_KEY_ID_FOR_$ (MODULE) := 1
```

3.2.8 Configuring the version of rollback for Loadable Trusted Application

In Trusty, apploader can prevent loadable TA rollback attack.

1. The apploader gets the current version from TA's manifest and get the last `stored_version` of TA from the secure storage. Compare the two versions. If the current version in TA is greater than or equal to `stored_version`, then load the TA.
2. Get `min_version` from TA's manifest. If `min_version` is greater than `stored_version`, `stored_version` is updated to `min_version` in the RPMB secure storage.

For example, the rollback version of the loadable TA can be added through the following diff.

```
diff --git a/manifest.json b/manifest.json
index 653201c..2be563c 100644
--- a/manifest.json
+++ b/manifest.json
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 {
     "uuid": "7dee2364-c036-425b-b086-df0f6c233c1b",
     "min_heap": 524288,
-    "min_stack": 65536
+    "min_stack": 65536,
+    "version": 1,
+    "min_version": 0
 }
```

Note: *version cannot be less than min_version; otherwise, the build fails.*

3.3 Configurations in U-Boot for security

U-Boot is loaded by SPL and verified with HAB. ATF starts U-Boot. The primary purpose of U-Boot is to load and verify Android images.

3.3.1 Overview of security features in U-Boot

Android Verified Boot (AVB) is enabled in i.MX Android images. There is an additional `vbmeta` image used in AVB. This `vbmeta` image does not contain any code that the device will execute. It is used by U-Boot to authenticate its own and other Android images. The other images to be authenticated with the `vbmeta` image include images for boot, dtbo, system, and vendor partitions. If there are other images containing executing code, like product, they are also authenticated based on the data in the `vbmeta` image. The hash value of

these images is calculated and the metadata is stored in the `vbmeta` image. The following figure shows the relationship of these images.




Figure 14. Relationship between vbmeta image and related images

To make sure that the `vbmeta` image is trusted, it is signed with the RSA key, and the signature of the `vbmeta` image is verified at boot time before the data in it are used to verify other images.

To prevent rollback attack, there is a rollback index value stored in the `vbmeta` image. The value can increase with the release of images. This rollback index value in the `vbmeta` image is also saved in the RPMB partition of eMMC after all the images are verified as bootable. If the rollback index value in the `vbmeta` image is smaller than the one stored in the RPMB partition of eMMC, U-Boot does not boot with the related images. With dual-bootloader enabled, SPL and U-Boot proper are not in one file, so there is another rollback index value for U-Boot proper.

To prevent the device from getting bricked during OTA, a/b slot feature is provided. Some partitions used to store images have two copies in the boot device. They are called "slot a" and "slot b". The image update process only flashes one slot. An update failure does not affect the other slot.

3.3.2 Generating and fusing the eMMC RPMB key

The RPMB partition of eMMC can be fused with the 256-bit secure key. The secure key can only be programmed one time. This secure key can only be accessed by secure world (either TEE or SPL). It is used to sign and verify data transfer between eMMC RPMB and TEE. Configuring the eMMC RPMB key is a prerequisite for provisioning other keys.

There are two ways to generate the RPMB key: CAAM/ELE hardware bound key and vendor-specified key. Both ways are associated with CAAM or ELE, which uses the value in efuse hardware. If the SRK hash value needs to be programmed into efuse hardware and close the chips, do it first, and only after that can the RPMB key be programmed.

- CAAM/ELE hardware bound key

The RPMB key can be derived from CAAM/ELE. This is hardware bound and is unique per device. TEE derives this hardware bound key in every boot from CAAM/ELE, and as it is bound to the CAAM/ELE hardware, so it does not need to store one copy of this key. This way is preferred as it is simpler and more secure.

Fastboot command is provided to set the RPMB key from CAAM/ELE hardware bound key:

```
$ fastboot oem set-rpmb-hardware-key
```

Another method is also provided to program an RPMB key which derived from CAAM/ELE, this method is enabled on boards which is HAB closed only. Using the i.MX 8MP evk board as example, modify the defconfig file as follows:

```
diff --git a/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig b/configs/
imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig
index 4e2238d789..b05627c255 100644
--- a/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig
+++ b/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_dual_defconfig
@@ -229,3 +229,4 @@ CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE="evk_8mp"
```

```
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT="evk_8mp"
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER="nxp"
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL="EVK_8MP"
+CONFIG_AUTO_SET_RPMB_KEY=y
```

Update the bootloader and bootup, then the RPMB key is set automatically on a HAB closed board.

- Vendor specified key

Vendor can specify any customized RPMB key on platforms with CAAM hardware, this way doesn't work for platforms which only support ELE (for example, i.MX 95). One copy of the key is encapsulated with CAAM and the generated key blob is saved into the last block of the eMMC BOOT1 partition. The BOOT1 partition size of eMMC on i.MX 8QuadMax MEK and i.MX 8QuadXPlus MEK is 8 MB. It is 4 MB on i.MX 8M Mini EVK, i.MX 8M Plus EVK, and i.MX8M Nano EVK. To prevent key blob from being tampered when the system is running, the BOOT1 partition is set with power-on write protection when the board boots up.

The location to store the key blob may need to be changed based on the board design. Two macros are used to control the location of the key blob. These two macros are the same for i.MX 8QuadMax MEK and i.MX 8QuadXPlus MEK. Their definitions are as follows:

```
#define KEYSLOT_HWPARTITION_ID 2
#define KEYSLOT_BLKs 0x3FFF
```

While for i.MX 8M Mini EVK and i.MX 8M Nano EVK, the definition is as follows:

```
#define KEYSLOT_HWPARTITION_ID 2
#define KEYSLOT_BLKs 0x1FFF
```

KEYSLOT_HWPARTITION_ID represents the eMMC partition. **0** means USERDATA partition, **1** means BOOT0 partition, and **2** means BOOT1 partition. KEYSLOT_BLKs represents the block in which the key blob is stored.

For i.MX 8QuadMax MEK, they are in the following files. For other platforms, it is in other board-related header files in the same folder.

```
/* Android Automotive */
${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/include/configs/
imx8qm_mek_android_auto.h
/* Standard Android */
${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/include/configs/
imx8qm_mek_android.h
```

The customized RPMB key file should be started with magic "RPMB" and followed by the raw key. The following steps show how to generate the default key file `rpmb key test.bin`:

[illegible]

The `\xHH` means eight-bit character whose value is the hexadecimal value 'HH'. You can replace above "00" with the key you want to set.

After generating the customized RPMB key file, the following fastboot commands are available to set the RPMB key:

```
$ fastboot stage rpmb_key_test.bin
$ fastboot oem set-rpmb-staged-key
```

After the RPMB key is programmed with either of the two ways, reboot the board. The RPMB service in Trusty OS is then initialized successfully.

3.3.3 Generating keys to sign and verify images

Images are signed during the time of building Android platform to ensure their integrity. A pair of asymmetric keys (AVB keys) is used to sign the `vbmeta` struct in the `vbmeta` image. On the standard Android platform, there is another pair of asymmetric keys (AVB boot keys) to sign the `vbmeta` struct in the boot image, which would be built as 'chained partition'. For more information about chained partition, see <https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+master/README.md>.

By default, the private AVB key used to sign the `vbmeta` struct in `vbmeta` image is located at:

```
${MY_ANDROID}/device/nxp/common/security/testkey_rsa4096.pem
```

Its corresponding public key is:

```
${MY_ANDROID}/device/nxp/common/security/testkey_public_rsa4096.bin.
```

The default private AVB boot key used to sign the boot image is located at:

```
${MY_ANDROID}/external/avb/test/data/testkey_rsa2048.pem
```

The private key can be generated with OpenSSL. For example, the following command can generate RSA-4096 private key `test_rsa4096_private.pem`:

```
openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:4096 -outform PEM -out  
custom_rsa4096_private.pem
```

The corresponding public key can be extracted from the private key with `avbtool`. The `avbtool` can be found in `${MY_ANDROID}/external/avb`. Execute the following command to extract the public key from the private key:

```
avbtool extract_public_key --key custom_rsa4096_private.pem --output  
custom_rsa4096_public.bin
```

SHA256_RSA4096 and SHA256_RSA2048 are recommended algorithm to sign the images for i.MX 8Quad and i.MX 8M devices whose Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM) can help accelerate the hash calculation. We can keep it as default.

Custom keys should be used to sign the images for production, examples to set the custom AVB key to sign the `vbmeta` image are as follows:

```
diff --git a/imx8q/mek_8q/BoardConfig.mk b/imx8q/mek_8q/BoardConfig.mk  
index 8e367bb..e1385f9_100644  
--- a/imx8q/mek_8q/BoardConfig.mk  
+++ b/imx8q/mek_8q/BoardConfig.mk  
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ BOARD_AVB_ENABLE := true  
ifeq ($(PRODUCT_IMX_CAR),true)  
BOARD_AVB_ALGORITHM := SHA256_RSA4096  
# The testkey_rsa4096.pem is copied from external/avb/test/data/  
testkey_rsa4096.pem  
-BOARD_AVB_KEY_PATH := device/nxp/common/security/testkey_rsa4096.pem  
+BOARD_AVB_KEY_PATH := ${your-key-directory}/custom_rsa4096_private.pem  
endif  
TARGET_USES_MKE2FS := true
```

Examples to set the custom AVB boot key to sign the boot image are as follows:

```
diff --git a/imx8q/mek_8q/BoardConfig.mk b/imx8q/mek_8q/BoardConfig.mk
index dbfb2821..744c2086 100644
--- a/imx8q/mek_8q/BoardConfig.mk
+++ b/imx8q/mek_8q/BoardConfig.mk
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ BOARD_AVB_ALGORITHM := SHA256_RSA4096
BOARD_AVB_KEY_PATH := device/nxp/common/security/testkey_rsa4096.pem
ifneq ($(PRODUCT_IMX_CAR), true)
-BOARD_AVB_BOOT_KEY_PATH := external/avb/test/data/testkey_rsa2048.pem
+BOARD_AVB_BOOT_KEY_PATH := ${your-key-directory}/custom_rsa2048_private.pem
BOARD_AVB_BOOT_ALGORITHM := SHA256_RSA2048
BOARD_AVB_BOOT_ROLLBACK_INDEX := 0
BOARD_AVB_BOOT_ROLLBACK_INDEX_LOCATION := 2
```

AVB checks the signature and the AVB public key when verifying the `vbmeta` image, so the AVB public key must be stored to the TEE backed RPMB when Trusty is enabled. Make the board enter fastboot mode, and execute the following commands:

```
$ fastboot stage custom_rsa4096_public.bin
$ fastboot oem set-public-key
```

`custom_rsa4096_public.bin` is the public AVB key just generated. If you use the default AVB keys for debug purpose, flash the default public key with the following commands:

```
$ fastboot stage testkey_public_rsa4096.bin
$ fastboot oem set-public-key
```

3.3.4 Bypass vbmeta/lock check for development purposes

Bypassing `vbmeta/lock` check is very convenient for development work. To unlock the device after all images are flashed, boot the board to the Android UI, enable "Developer options" in the "Settings" Application, open "OEM unlocking" under "Developer options", and reboot the board to fastboot mode. Execute the following command:

```
$ sudo fastboot oem unlock
```

After the board is unlocked, images can be flashed with the `fastboot` command. To bypass `vbmeta` check, use `fastboot` to flash the `vbmeta` image with the `--disable-verity` option. Take i.MX 8QuadMax MEK as an example, execute the following commands:

```
$ sudo fastboot flash vbmeta_a vbmeta-imx8qm.img --disable-verity
$ sudo fastboot flash vbmeta_b vbmeta-imx8qm.img --disable-verity
```

3.3.5 Changing the value of the rollback index in images

There are three rollback index values involved in this release: bootloader rollback index, boot rollback index, and `vbmeta` rollback index. The bootloader rollback index is used to prevent bootloader rollback attack. It is only available when the dual-bootloader feature is enabled. The boot rollback index is available when the boot image is built as chained partition. It is only supported on standard Android platform. The `vbmeta` rollback index is supported on all platforms. By default, the initial value of all kinds of rollback index is zero.

When a version of images is to be released to fix a bug in previous version, which makes previous images under potential attacks, it is suggested to increase the rollback index values by one compared to previous

version. For more information about rollback index usage, see <https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+master/README.md>.

In this release of i.MX Android platform, some modifications are made to the Android build system. A shell script named `imx-make.sh` is provided to build U-Boot and kernel code independently from the building process of Android images. To make the build process simple, as all images can be built with only one command, `imx-make.sh` starts to build Android images after U-Boot and kernel are built. When executing the `imx-make.sh` script, a shell variable named `BOOTLOADER_RBINDEX` can be specified to change the bootloader rollback index, a shell variable named `AVB_BOOT_RBINDEX` can be specified to change the boot rollback index, and a shell variable named `AVB_RBINDEX` can be specified to change the vbmata rollback index.

As an example, the following command can be executed to change the rollback index values. Change `${bootloader_rbindex}`, `${avb_rbindex}`, and `${avb_boot_rbindex}` to the value you want to set:

```
BOOTLOADER_RBINDEX=${bootloader_rbindex} AVB_RBINDEX=${avb_rbindex}  
AVB_BOOT_RBINDEX=${avb_boot_rbindex} ./imx-make.sh -j4
```

If the U-Boot and kernel are already built and they do not need to be updated, `make` can be used to build vbmata and other related images need to be updated. Change the rollback index value as shown in the following example. Change `${avb_rbindex}` and `${avb_boot_rbindex}` to the value you want to set.

```
make -j4 AVB_RBINDEX=${avb_rbindex} AVB_BOOT_RBINDEX=${avb_boot_rbindex}
```

3.3.6 Storing the bootloader rollback index in the blob format

By default, the bootloader rollback index is stored in plaintext within the RPMB. However, this method may have security concerns if the hacker can bypass the RPMB authentication on some vulnerable eMMC chips. To prevent hackers from tampering with the rollback index value and launching rollback attacks, U-Boot supports encapsulating the bootloader rollback index into blob format before storing it in the RPMB. The U-Boot configuration option `CONFIG_IMX_ROLLBACK_BLOB` is used to enable this feature.

Because the plaintext format and the blob format of the rollback index are incompatible, U-Boot with this feature enabled cannot work on the devices that have already completed RPMB initialization in the field. Therefore, it is only recommended to enable this feature on new devices.

U-Boot determines whether the RPMB has been initialized by checking the magic number at the beginning of the RPMB. If the `CONFIG_IMX_ROLLBACK_BLOB` is set, U-Boot rejects to boot if RPMB is not initialized or the RPMB magic number does not match the expected value. To initialize the blob storage space of the bootloader rollback index in uninitialized RPMB, another configuration `CONFIG_RPMB_INIT_ALLOW` can be used. It should only be set for production, and then it should be disabled for release.

The encryption features can be used during the SPL stage by default. Taking i.MX 8M Quad WEVK as an example, enable the following configurations in the U-Boot configuration files, which are used during the production process, to perform the blob storage space initialization for the bootloader rollback index:

```
CONFIG_IMX_ROLLBACK_BLOB=y  
CONFIG_RPMB_INIT_ALLOW=y
```

After the blob storage space initialization for the bootloader rollback index is complete, the configuration `CONFIG_RPMB_INIT_ALLOW` should be removed and any corruption on the blob would be treated as errors.

3.3.7 Programming the attestation key

The keystore key attestation aims to provide a way to strongly determine if an asymmetric key pair is hardware-backed, what the properties of the key are, and what constraints are applied to its usage.

The Remote Key Provisioning (RKP) is now used to provision short-lived attestation keys to the devices. Contact Google about the tools and process to extract the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) and upload it to Google.

For devices that have not switched to use RKP, Google provides the attestation "keybox", which contains private keys (RSA and ECDSA) and the corresponding certificate chains to partners from the Android Partner Front End (APFE). After retrieving the "keybox" from Google, parse the "keybox", and provision the keys and certificates to the secure storage. Both keys and certificates should be encoded with Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER).

Two ways are provided to provision the attestation keys and certificates from the keybox in factory:

- Provisioning the keys and certificates in the plaintext format directly.
- Provisioning the keys and certificates in the AES-ECB encrypted format, which is then decrypted into plaintext before written into the secure storage.

Before the provisioning, make sure that the secure storage is properly initialized for the Trusty OS.

1. Provision keys and certificates in plaintext format.

Fastboot commands are provided to flash the attestation keys and certificates in plaintext format to the device. This way is simpler but has more risk of leaking the keys. Boot the board into fastboot mode and use the following commands.

- Set the RSA private key:

```
$ fastboot stage ${path-to-rsa-private-key}
$ fastboot oem set-rsa-atte-key
```

- Set the ECDSA private key:

```
$ fastboot stage ${path-to-ecdsa-private-key}
$ fastboot oem set-ec-atte-key
```

- Append the RSA certificate chain:

```
$ fastboot stage ${path-to-rsa-atte-cert}
$ fastboot oem append-rsa-atte-cert
```

The second command may need to be executed multiple times to append the whole certificate chain.

- Append the ECDSA certificate chain:

```
$ fastboot stage < path-to-ecdsa-cert >
$ fastboot oem append-ec-atte-cert
```

The second command may need to be executed multiple times to append the whole certificate chain.

2. Provision keys and certificates in AES-ECB encrypted format.

Fastboot commands are provided to flash AES-ECB encoded keys and certificates to the device. It can prevent leakage of the plaintext materials. This way encrypts the keys and certificates with the MPPUBK, and then the encrypted keys and certificates would be decrypted into plaintext in Trusty OS before they are written into secure storage. This way can only be used on the HAB CLOSED board. The workflow is as follows.




Figure 15. Flashing AES-ECB encoded keys and certificates to device

Boot the board into fastboot mode and perform the following steps:

a. Get MPPUBK:

```
$ fastboot oem get-mppubk
$ fastboot get_staged mppubk.bin
```

b. Encrypt the plaintext attestation keys and certificates with the MPPUBK.

The attestation keys and certificates should be encrypted in AES-ECB with the generated MPPUBK. The following is a simple encryption python scripts `gen_secure_atte.py`:

```
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
import struct
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='Secure Provision encrypt
tool.')
parser.add_argument('key', type=file)
parser.add_argument('plaintext', type=file)
parser.add_argument('blob', type=argparse.FileType('w'))
args = parser.parse_args()
data = args.plaintext.read()
data_len = len(data)
written_len = struct.pack('I', data_len)
#AES need 16 bytes align, so pad the data it
data += '\0' * (((len(data)+15)/16 * 16) - len(data))
key2 = args.key.read()
key = key2[0:16]
magic = "!AT"
pad0 = struct.pack('B', 0)
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB)
blob = cipher.encrypt(data)
args.blob.write(magic)
args.blob.write(pad0)
args.blob.write(written_len)
args.blob.write(blob)
#blob structure describe as below:
#{
#  char magic[4] = "!AT";
#  uint32_t len = plaintext_length
#  uint8 *encrypted_data
#}
```

Encrypt the keys and the certificates on the host computer:

```
$ python gen_secure_atte.py mppubk.bin < path-to-plaintext-keys-or-
certificates > < encrypted-keys-or-certificates >
```

c. Set encrypted RSA private key:

```
$ fastboot stage ${path-to-encrypted-rsa-private-key}
$ fastboot oem set-rsa-atte-key-enc
```

d. Set encrypted ECDSA private key:

```
$ fastboot stage ${path-to-encrypted-ecdsa-private-key}
$ fastboot oem set-ec-atte-key-enc
```

e. Append encrypted RSA certificate chain:

```
$ fastboot stage ${path-to-encrypted-rsa-atte-cert}
$ fastboot oem append-rsa-atte-cert-enc
```

The second command may need to be executed multiple times to append the whole certificate chain.

f. Append encrypted ECDSA certificate chain:

```
$ fastboot stage < path-to-encrypted-ecdsa-cert >
$ fastboot oem append-ec-atte-cert-enc
```

The second command may need to be executed multiple times to append the whole certificate chain.

3.3.8 Programming the hardware identifiers

ID attestation allows the device to provide proof of its hardware identifiers. For more information about ID attestation, see <https://source.android.com/security/keystore/attestation>. All hardware identifiers provisioned should match related system properties. The following table shows a map of all supported identifiers and the system properties.

Table 5. Hardware identifiers

Identifiers	Build property
ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND	ro.product.brand
ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE	ro.product.device
ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER	ro.product.manufacturer
ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL	ro.product.model
ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT	ro.product.product.name
ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL	ro.serialno

The hardware identifiers are provisioned in bootloader and they can be set by configs. Take i.MX 8QM as example, its hardware identifiers are set in {UBOOT_PATH}/configs/imx8qm_mek_android_trusty_defconfig:

```
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND="Android"
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE="mek_8q"
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT="mek_8q"
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER="nxp"
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL="MEK-MX8Q"
```

Note that the serial number is unique for each device, so its value is auto detected in bootloader.

Change the identifiers as needed, then flash updated bootloader image and boot the board into fastboot mode, run the following command to provision the identifiers:

```
$ fastboot oem set-device-id
```

3.3.9 Provisioning Widevine L1 keybox

The Widevine is a widely used Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology, which helps to protect media streaming from being copied and redistributed. The L1 level Widevine is now supported on the i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8QuadXPlus, i.MX 8QuadMax, and i.MX 95 boards.

For devices that support Widevine Provision 4.0, provisioning keybox is not needed. Contact Google and refer to the Widevine document for more details on provisioning.

For devices that support Widevine Provision 2.0, just like attestation keys and certificates, two ways are provided to provision the Widevine keybox. One is provisioning the keybox binary in the plaintext format, and the other is provisioning the keybox binary in the AES-ECB encrypted format, which is then decrypted into plaintext before written into the secure storage.

- Provisioning the keybox binary in the plaintext format:

Fastboot commands are provided to flash the keybox in the plaintext format to the device. This way is simpler but has more risks of leaking the keys.

Boot the board into fastboot mode and run the following commands:

```
$ fastboot stage ${path-to-keybox-binary}
$ fastboot oem provision-wv-keybox
```

- Provisioning the keybox binary in the AES-ECB encrypted format:

Fastboot commands are provided to flash the AES-ECB encoded keybox to the device. It can prevent leakage of the plaintext materials. This way encrypts the keybox with the MPPUBK (Manufacturing Protection Public Key, generated from the CAAM module), and then the encrypted keybox is decrypted into plaintext in the Trusty OS before written into the secure storage. This way can only be used on the HAB CLOSED board (The manufacturing protection feature is not ready on i.MX 8ULP, so this feature is disabled on i.MX 8ULP).

Perform the following steps to encrypt the keybox and provision it into the device:

1. Get the MPPUBK.

```
$ fastboot oem get-mppubk
$ fastboot get_staged mppubk.bin
```

2. Encrypt the plaintext keybox with the MPPUBK.

The plaintext keybox binary should be encrypted in AES-ECB with the generated MPPUBK. Do the encryption with the python scripts `gen_secure_atte.py`, which is mentioned in [Section 3.3.7](#).

```
$ python gen_secure_atte.py mppubk.bin ${path-to-plaintext-keybox}
${encrypted-keybox}
```

3. Provision the Widevine keybox.

```
$ fastboot stage ${path-to-encrypted-keybox}
$ fastboot oem provision-wv-keybox-enc
```

3.3.10 Changing the way to store lock status and/or rollback index

For images with TEE enabled, lock status and rollback index values are stored in RPMB. The rollback index value for AVB is written/read by TEE into/from RPMB but the write/read process is initiated by U-Boot. For i.MX Android with dual-bootloader feature, there is a rollback index for bootloader, this rollback index value for bootloader is written/read by SPL into/from RPMB.

Rollback index values and lock status can be used for many purposes as designed by developers, not limited to the usage in i.MX Android code. At this point, it is necessary to know how the lock status and rollback index values are stored on board.

For i.MX Android with dual-bootloader feature, the rollback index value for bootloader is read from RPMB to compare with the one in the bootloader image. If the rollback index value is bigger than the one stored in RPMB and the images are verified as bootable, rollback index value in bootloader image is written into RPMB. This logic is completed in the following function:

```
static int spl_verify_rbidx(struct mmc *mmc, AvbABSlotData *slot,
struct spl_image_info *spl_image)
```

In the following file:

```
${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/lib/avb/fsl/fsl_avb_ab_flow.c
```

For new boards just flashed with images, at their first time of boot, a default rollback index value is written in RPMB in the following function:

```
int rpmb_init(void)
```

In the following file:

```
${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/lib/avb/fsl/fsl_avb_ab_flow.c
```

From the functions listed above, it is known that the rollback index value for bootloader is located by a `kblb_hdr_t` type structure variable. This structure has a magic value. A member with the type of `kblb_tag_t` is used to specify the rollback index value.

Now in i.MX Android Auto, the offset of the rollback index value for bootloader is controlled by a macro named `BOOTLOADER_RBIDX_START` as defined in the following two files respectively for i.MX 8QuadMax MEK and i.MX 8QuadXPlus MEK.

```
${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/include/configs/
imx8qm_mek_android_auto.h
${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/include/configs/
imx8qxp_mek_android_auto.h
```

The value for `BOOTLOADER_RBIDX_START` is `0x3FF000`, 4KB offset from the end of the RPMB partition.

The read process of the rollback index value for AVB is initiated by U-Boot in the following function:

```
FbLockState fastboot_get_lock_stat(void)
```

In the following file:

```
${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/drivers/usb/gadget/
fastboot_lock_unlock.c
```

For images with TEE enabled, this function invokes the following function. It uses TIPC to communicate with TEE to get the value.

```
int trusty_read_lock_state(uint8_t *lock_state)
```

The write process of the rollback index value for AVB is initiated by U-Boot in the following function:

```
int fastboot_set_lock_stat(FbLockState lock)
```

In the following file:

```
${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/drivers/usb/gadget/  
fastboot_lock_unlock.c
```

For images with TEE enabled, this function invokes the following function. It uses TIPC to communicate with TEE to save the value.

```
int trusty_write_lock_state(uint8_t lock_state)
```

Rollback index value for AVB is read to compare with the one in vbmeta image and the one in vbmeta image is saved into RPMB if necessary. This logic is completed in the following function:

```
AvbABFlowResult avb_flow_dual_uboot(AvbABOps* ab_ops,  
const char* const* requested_partitions,  
AvbSlotVerifyFlags flags,  
AvbHashtreeErrorMode hashtree_error_mode,  
AvbSlotVerifyData** out_data)
```

In the following file:

```
${MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp-opensource/uboot-imx/lib/avb/fsl/fsl_avb_ab_flow.c
```

The following two functions are invoked to read and store the rollback index for vbmeta:

```
AvbIOResult fsl_read_rollback_index_rpmb(AvbOps* ops, size_t rollback_index_slot,  
uint64_t* out_rollback_index)  
AvbIOResult fsl_write_rollback_index_rpmb(AvbOps* ops, size_t rollback_index_slot,  
uint64_t rollback_index)
```

They finally communicate with TEE to finish the work.

3.3.11 Choosing to boot a specific slot

With both slots flashed with images, a specific slot can be chosen to boot manually for development purpose. Boot the board into fastboot mode, and execute the following command to boot from "slot a" or "slot b":

```
$ sudo fastboot set_active a  
$ sudo fastboot set_active b
```

3.3.12 Disabling development options in U-Boot

To facilitate development, some development options are set in U-Boot, which may bring in potential security holes. Before shipping the final products, these options must be closed.

- Boot delay

By default, the U-Boot reserves 2 seconds count-down to help developer stop at U-Boot and run some U-Boot commands. This can be disabled by setting `CONFIG_BOOTDELAY` to `-2`. For i.MX 8M Plus EVK, make the following changes. Similar changes need to be made on other platforms that you are working on.

```
diff --git a/configs/imx8mp-evk-android-trusty-defconfig b/configs/  
imx8mp-evk-android-trusty-defconfig
```

```
index 80a4d45a5e..0ea9e3b9fc 100644
--- a/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
+++ b/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
@@ -185,3 +185,4 @@ CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE="evk_8mp"
    CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT="evk_8mp"
    CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER="nxp"
    CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL="EVK_8MP"
+CONFIG_BOOTDELAY=-2
```

- **bootargs/bootconfig appending**

The `bootargs` or `bootconfig` may need to be changed frequently during development. NXP U-Boot supports appending the U-Boot variable `append_bootargs` and `append_bootconfig` to the default `bootargs/bootconfig`, which will be passed to the kernel. However, this feature can be used by hackers to compromise the device and should be disabled in any formal release. To disable the `bootargs/bootconfig` appending feature, disable `CONFIG_APPEND_BOOTARGS`. For i.MX 8M Plus EVK, make the following changes. Similar changes need to be made on other platforms that you are working on.

```
diff --git a/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig b/configs/
imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
index 80a4d45a5e..62ab4afaa0 100644
--- a/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
+++ b/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
@@ -171,7 +171,6 @@ CONFIG_CMD_BMP=y
    CONFIG_LZ4=y
    CONFIG_FLASH_MCUFIRMWARE_SUPPORT=y
-CONFIG_APPEND_BOOTARGS=y
    CONFIG_SPL_MMC_SUPPORT=y
    CONFIG_AVB_WARNING_LOGO=y
    CONFIG_AVB_WARNING_LOGO_COLS=0x320
```

- **Disable manufacturing production public key extraction**

The manufacturing production public key can be used as encryption/decryption keys in some cases, leaking the key has potential risk of leaking other important materials. The extraction of the manufacturing production public must be disabled for shipping images. For i.MX 8M Plus EVK, you can make below changes. Similar changes need to be made on other platforms that you are working on.

```
diff --git a/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig b/configs/
imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
index 80a4d45a5e..61be3f5ebe 100644
--- a/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
+++ b/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
@@ -185,3 +185,4 @@ CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE="evk_8mp"
    CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT="evk_8mp"
    CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER="nxp"
    CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL="EVK_8MP"
+CONFIG_GENERATE_MPPUBK=n
```

3.3.13 Secure unlock

Secure unlock is designed to prevent unauthorized unlock. It requires the unlock credential. The unlock operation can only occur after a valid unlock credential is provided.

An example is provided, which generates the unlock credential with serial number and MPPUBK (Manufacturing Protection Public Key, generated from CAAM module). To enable the secure unlock feature, enable

CONFIG_SECURE_UNLOCK. For i.MX 8M Plus EVK, make the following changes. Similar changes need to be made on other platforms that you are working on:

```
diff --git a/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig b/configs/
imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
index 80a4d45a5e..b3da5c6ea3 100644
--- a/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
+++ b/configs/imx8mp_evk_android_trusty_defconfig
@@ -185,3 +185,4 @@ CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE="evk_8mp"
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT="evk_8mp"
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER="nxp"
CONFIG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL="EVK_8MP"
+CONFIG_SECURE_UNLOCK=y
```

Perform the following steps to verify the secure unlock feature. These operations can only be executed on the HAB closed boards (Manufacturing protection feature is not ready on i.MX 8ULP, secure unlock feature requires the MPPUBK support, so this feature is disabled on i.MX 8ULP):

1. Get MPPUBK.

```
$ fastboot oem get-mppubk
$ fastboot get_staged mppubk.bin
```

2. Get the serial number.

```
$ fastboot oem get-serial-number
$ fastboot get_staged serial.bin
```

3. Generate the unlock credential. Encrypt serial.bin with mppubk.bin on the host PC. For the encryption script, see [Section 3.3.7](#).

```
$ python gen_secure_atte.py mppubk.bin serial.bin serial-enc.bin
```

4. Verify the secure unlock feature.

```
$ fastboot stage serial-enc.bin
$ fastboot oem unlock
```

You may need to lock the device first if the device is already in unlocked state.

3.3.14 Secure firmware loader

On i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus, and i.MX 95, Widevine L1 is enabled. Therefore, to protect the VPU firmware, the secure firmware loader is enabled. The firmware to be protected is encrypted with an AES symmetric key, and then signed with an asymmetric key generated with OPENSSL. When the firmware needs to be loaded, the signed firmware is sent to the Trusty OS, which is verified and decrypted by the firmware Loader Trusted Application.

By default, the key used to encrypt the firmware is located at:

```
${MY_ANDROID}/device/nxp/common/security/firmware_encrypt_key.bin
```

The private key that is used to sign the firmware is located at:

```
${MY_ANDROID}/device/nxp/common/security/firmware_private_key.der
```

The public key in the RPMB partition is used to verify the firmware and it is located at:

```
${MY_ANDROID}/device/nxp/common/security/firmware_public_key.der
```

These keys also have been copied to `$OUT/firmware_test_keys/`. Users can replace them as required.

The three keys above can be directly generated by an example script located at:

```
{MY_ANDROID}/device/nxp/common/tools/generate_key.sh
```

These keys can be generated by referring to the following commands:

```
./{MY_ANDROID}/device/nxp/common/tools/generate_key.sh firmware_private_key.der  
firmware_public_key.der firmware_encrypt_key.bin
```

To protect the key required for decryption and signature verification, the public key and encrypt key need to be flashed to the RPMB partition, and the Trusty OS then obtains the two keys from the RPMB partition through the secure storage.

Make the board enter fastboot mode, and then execute the following commands to flash the decrypt key:

```
$ fastboot stage firmware_encrypt_key.bin  
$ fastboot oem provision-firmware-encrypt-key
```

Make the board enter fastboot mode, and then execute the following commands to flash the verify key:

```
$ fastboot stage firmware_public_key.der  
$ fastboot oem provision-firmware-sign-key
```

When `imx-make.sh` is used to build the kernel module, `package_tool` is used to encrypt and sign the specified VPU firmware. When the build is finished, `vpu_fw_imx8_dec.bin.signed` is created at the `{MY_ANDROID}/vendor/nxp/linux-firmware-imx/firmware/vpu/` directory.

3.3.15 Setting up encrypted boot OTA

Encrypted boot OTA allows to upgrade images with encrypted boot enabled on a HAB closed device.

3.3.15.1 Provisioning a DEK blob

The DEK blob files that obtained in the encrypt process are essential in the upgrade process. Save them as `dek_blob_spl.bin` and `dek_blob_bl.bin`. The following commands are used to provision DEK blobs to secure storage.

```
$ fastboot stage dek_blob_spl.bin  
$ fastboot oem provision-spl-dek-blob  
$ fastboot stage dek_blob_bl.bin  
$ fastboot oem provision-bootloader-dek-blob
```

3.3.15.2 Setting up bootargs to enable encrypted boot OTA

The encrypted boot OTA is not enabled by default. You can add the bootargs to enable it. Set device bootargs as follows:

```
=> setenv append_bootconfig androidboot.encrypted_boot_ota=true  
=> saveenv
```

If this `bootargs` is set, the post-installation script loads the encrypted bootloader, fetches the dek blob automatically, and then inserts it in the right place.

3.3.16 Provisioning the System Renewability Message (SRM)

Currently, the platforms that support High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) also support System Renewability Message (SRM). The SRM is a list of revoked Receiver IDs, which is signed by the Digital Content Protection (DCP). It is verified by the HDCP Transmitter before being stored into non-volatile memory when provisioning SRM files. If the SRM needs to be supported, use the following commands to provision SRM files corresponding to v1_4 HDCP and v2_2 HDCP.

```
$ fastboot stage ${path-to-srm}
$ fastboot oem provision-srm
```

Note: Currently, only the v1_4 HDCP and v2_2 HDCP versions of the SRM are supported.

3.4 Configurations in Linux/Android platform for security features

3.4.1 DM-Verity relationship with vbmeta

The Device Mapper verity (DM-verity) kernel feature supports transparent integrity checking of block devices. This feature helps Android users be sure that when booting a device, it is in the same state as when it is flashed. The `vbmeta` image contains a kernel command-line descriptor for setting up DM-verity for `system.img`, together with hashtree descriptors for `system.img` and `vendor.img`. The hash tree descriptor in the `vbmeta` image contains the root hash, salt and the offset of the hashtree, which are essential to do the DM-verity check for system and vendor partitions.

When the DM-verity is enabled for system and vendor partition, any operations that break the consistency of the `system.img`, `vendor.img`, and `vbmeta.img` will cause DM-verity check failure, and thus cause the system boot failure.

3.4.2 Trusty OS Linux driver configuration

The Trusty OS supports to output the logs to UART or TIPC log channel. The Trusty OS Linux driver supports to carry the logs from the Trusty OS by TIPC channel. By default, this feature is enabled in the reference image.

In the Trusty OS Linux driver `trusty-log`, when it is enabled, the Trusty OS shuts down the UART output log port. The UART driver in the Trusty OS outputs characters synchronously and it costs much IO time.

The `trusty-log` driver is configured in the device tree as follows:

```
trusty-log {
    compatible = "android,trusty-log-v1";
};
```

3.4.3 Trusty based keymaster, gatekeeper, and secure storage proxy

The trusty backed keymaster HAL is a dynamically loadable library used by the keystore service to provide hardware-backed cryptographic services. It does not provide any sensitive operations in user space, or even in kernel space. All sensitive operations are delegated to the keymaster TA in the Trusty OS (secure world). The relationship is shown in the following figure.




Figure 16. Relationship between keymaster HAL and keymaster TA

The trusty backed keymaster HAL 3.0 is designed for Android Pie 9 or later, which cannot work for Android Oreo 8.1. Instead, the Android Oreo 8.1 is running trusty backed keymaster HAL 2.0.

The Gatekeeper subsystem performs device pattern/password authentication. It enrolls and verifies passwords through an HMAC with a secret key. Additionally, the Gatekeeper throttles consecutive failed verification attempts and refuses to service requests based on a given timeout and a given number of consecutive failed attempts. The trusty backed gatekeeper sends all critical operations to the gatekeeper TA in trusty.

The secure storage proxy is running in the Linux end to communicate with the storage TA in trusty to perform secure storage read/write operations, for example, reading/writing data from/to RPMB partition of the eMMC device.

Trusty backed keymaster, gatekeeper, and secure storage proxy all depend on secure storage, which can only be accessed by trusty, but users may not want to set the secure storage properly (like the key of RPMB), because in some instances, security is not so important and can even be neglected. In this case, both keymaster and gatekeeper fall back to software backed version, and they are chosen by the `androidboot.keystore` variable in the kernel command line.

When the trusty and associated trusted applications (such as keymaster TA and storage TA) are initialized properly, U-Boot sets `androidboot.keystore` to `trusty`, otherwise to `software`, and then passes it to the kernel through the kernel command line. The `androidboot.keystore` is translated to `ro.boot.keystore` Android property, and then the initialization program chooses the keymaster and gatekeeper version (trusty backed or software backed) and starts the secure storage proxy according to this property. The following figure shows the workflow.




Figure 17. TEE and TA initialization and workflow

3.4.4 Disabling GPU flat mapping

When GPU flat mapping is enabled, hackers may be able to snoop privileged memory. The GPU flat mapping is enabled by default, but the user can disable it by adding bootargs as follows:

```
galcore.baseAddress=<dram-base-address> galcore.physSize=0
galcore.mmuException=0
```

The `dram-base-address` varies on different platforms. The value should be decided based on each platform. Take i.MX 8M Plus as an example. The user can disable the GPU flat mapping by adding the following bootargs in `{MY_ANDROID}/imx8m/evk_8mp/BoardConfig.mk`:

```
diff --git a/imx8m/evk_8mp/BoardConfig.mk b/imx8m/evk_8mp/BoardConfig.mk
index 4732374b..83089631 100644
--- a/imx8m/evk_8mp/BoardConfig.mk
+++ b/imx8m/evk_8mp/BoardConfig.mk
@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ BOARD_KERNEL_CMDLINE := init=/init
 androidboot.console=ttyMXCL androidboot.hardware
 BOARD_KERNEL_CMDLINE += transparent_hugepage=never
 BOARD_KERNEL_CMDLINE += swiotlb=65536
+# disable GPU flat mapping
+BOARD_KERNEL_CMDLINE += galcore.baseAddress=0x40000000 galcore.physSize=0
galcore.mmuException=0
+
# display config
BOARD_KERNEL_CMDLINE += androidboot.lcd_density=240
androidboot.primary_display=imx-drm
```

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5 Revision History

Revision history		
Document ID	Release date	Description
UG10158 v.android-16.0.0_1.4.0	1 April 2026	i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8ULP, i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus, and i.MX 95 GA release.

Revision history...continued

Document ID	Release date	Description
UG10158 v.android-16.0.0_1.2.0	6 January 2026	i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8ULP, i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus, and i.MX 95 GA release.
UG10158 v.android-16.0.0_1.0.0	28 October 2025	i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8ULP, i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus GA release, and i.MX 95 Beta release.
UG10158 v.android-15.0.0_2.0.0	24 July 2025	i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8ULP, i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus GA release, i.MX 95 19x19 EVK Beta release, and i.MX 95 15x15 EVK Alpha release.
UG10158 v.android-15.0.0_1.2.0	11 April 2025	i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8ULP, i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus GA release, and i.MX 95 Beta release.
UG10158 v.android-15.0.0_1.0.0	24 January 2025	i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8ULP, i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus GA release, and i.MX 95 Beta release.
UG10158 v.android-14.0.0_2.2.0	18 October 2024	i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8ULP, i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus GA release, i.MX 95 (A1 15x15) Alpha release, and i.MX 95 (A1 19x19) Beta release.
UG10158 v.android-14.0.0_2.0.0	9 August 2024	i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8ULP, i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus GA release, and i.MX 95 Alpha release. Updated the document ID.
ASUG v.android-14.0.0_1.2.0	19 April 2024	i.MX 8ULP EVK, i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8QuadMax, and i.MX 8Quad XPlus GA release.
ASUG v.android-14.0.0_1.0.0	6 February 2024	i.MX 8ULP EVK, i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8QuadMax, and i.MX 8Quad XPlus GA release.
ASUG v.android-13.0.0_2.2.0	24 October 2023	i.MX 8ULP EVK, i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8QuadMax, and i.MX 8Quad XPlus GA release.
ASUG v.android-13.0.0_2.0.0	07/2023	i.MX 8ULP EVK Beta release, i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8QuadMax, and i.MX 8 QuadXPlus GA release.
ASUG v.android-13.0.0_1.2.0	03/2023	i.MX 8ULP EVK Beta release, i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8QuadMax, and i.MX 8 QuadXPlus GA release.
ASUG v.android-13.0.0_1.0.0	01/2023	i.MX 8ULP EVK Beta release, i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8QuadMax, and i.MX 8 QuadXPlus GA release.
ASUG v.android-12.1.0_1.0.0	10/2022	i.MX 8ULP EVK Beta release, i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8QuadMax, and i.MX 8 QuadXPlus GA release.
ASUG v.android-12.0.0_2.0.0	07/2022	i.MX 8ULP EVK Beta release, i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, and i.MX 8M Quad GA release.

Revision history...continued

Document ID	Release date	Description
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ASUG v.android-11.0.0_2.6.0	01/2022	Corrected a typo in Section 3.3.2.
ASUG v.android-11.0.0_2.6.0	01/2022	i.MX 8ULP EVK Beta release, i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, and i.MX 8M Quad GA release.
ASUG v.android-11.0.0_2.4.0	10/2021	i.MX 8ULP EVK Alpha release, i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, and i.MX 8M Quad GA release.
ASUG v.android-11.0.0_2.2.0	07/2021	i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, and i.MX 8M Quad GA release.
ASUG v.android-11.0.0_2.0.0	04/2021	i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Nano, i.MX 8M Plus, and i.MX 8M Quad GA release.
ASUG v.android-11.0.0_1.0.0	12/2020	i.MX 8M Plus EVK Beta release, and all the other i.MX 8 GA release.
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ASUG v.android-10.0.0_2.1.0	04/2020	i.MX 8M Plus Alpha and i.MX 8QuadXPlus Beta release.
ASUG v.android-10.0.0_1.0.0	03/2020	Deleted the Android 10 image.
ASUG v.android-10.0.0_1.0.0	02/2020	i.MX 8M Mini, i.MX 8M Quad, i.MX 8QuadMax, and i.MX 8QuadXPlus GA release.
ASUG v.P9.0.0_2.0.0-ga	08/2019	Updated the location of the SCFW porting kit.
ASUG v.P9.0.0_2.0.0-ga	04/2019	i.MX 8M, i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus GA release.
ASUG v.P9.0.0_1.0.0-ga	01/2019	i.MX 8M, i.MX 8QuadMax, i.MX 8QuadXPlus GA release.
ASUG v.P9.0.0_1.0.0-beta	11/2018	Initial release

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